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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law 
Marcel Kahant 
Edward B. Rocktt 
This Article explores the relationship between takeovers, legal doctrines, and private order­
ing. The authors first argue that the sanctioning of the poison pill and the ·'just say no" defense by 
Delaware courts was far less consequential than feared by its critics and hoped for by its propo­
nents. Rather. market participants adapted to these legal developments by embracing two adaptive 
devices-greater board independence and increased incentive compensation-which had the effect 
of tramforming the pill, a potentially pernicious governance roof, into a device that is plausibly in 
shareholders' imerest. Interestingly, however (and for critics of rhe pill, disconcertingly), market 
participants neither tried to change the law nor opt out of it. The awhors place these developments 
in a broader perspective. They draw a distinction between bilateral devices-which enjoy support 
from both stockholders and managers-and unilmeral devices, ami argue that bilateral devices are 
more likely to be welfare-enhancing, are more stable, are privileged by Delaware law, and tend to 
further Delaware's statc.ts as leading domicile for public corporations. Greater board independence 
and increased incentive compensation are examples of such bilateral devices. The authors conclude 
by examining why Delaware courts emhmced the poison pill (at the time, a largely unilateral de­
vice, albeit one with hilateral features) and how they should deal with the use of pills by companies 
IVith stagKered boards. 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, a wave of hostile takeovers burst on the scene 
and sparked a public debate over corporate control that continues to 
ti.is day. Positions polarized quickly, with academics largely applaud­
ing the phenomenon and lawyers representing corporate boards 
largely decrying i t .  ·while some have modified their positions some­
what. the debate remains remarkably unchanged.' 
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1 See, for example, Lucian Arye Bcbchuk, 1he Case Against Board Veto in Corporate 
Takeo1·ers, 69 U Chi L Rev 975, 977-81 (arguing, as Bebchuk has since the 1980s. that boards 
should not be P<�rmitll:d to block nuncoercive offers); i\·lartin Liplun, Pif/.1; Polls, and Professors 
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Although it seemed at the time that the issues facing the Dela­
ware courts-whether a poison pill was legal; whether managers could 
"just say no"-had decisive importance, somehow, in retrospect, they 
do not seem to have mattered quite so much. None of the p arade of 
horribles predicted by partisans came to pass. Though takeover tactics 
have changed somewhat, the takeover game has continued along, its 
pace determined more by macroeconomic factors than by the details 
of legal doctrine, with new modes of gaining control developing as 
older methods have become more difficult. Most strikingly, despite ju­
dicial and legislative rejection of the academics' preference for rela­
tively unrestricted hostile takeovers, and despite the granting of great 
discretion to managers to reject acquisition proposals that their share­
holders might want to accept, merger and acquisition activity reached 
record levels during the 1990s. 
What is one to make of this? In  this Article, we seek to under­
stand the relationship between legal doctrine and the world of take­
overs, and to assess the significance of corporate law from a broader 
perspective. Our conclusion is that the role of courts is far less central 
than the partisans in the takeover debate assumed. Even the most im­
portant of the Delaware Supreme Court decisions seems, in retro­
spect, to be little more than a small piece of an overarching reequili­
brating mechanism that adjusts to perturbations. This is an Article 
about the relationship between corporate law and private ordering. 
In Part I, we briefly review the takeover scene of the 1980s and its 
subsequent evolution in the 1990s. The most prominent developments 
during this period were the increasing use of incentive compensation, 
the increasing independence of boards, and record levels of merger 
and acquisition ("M&A") activity. Along with these developments, the 
line between hostile and friendly tender offers blurred. Also notewor­
thy are the changes that did not occur. Specifically, academics' favored 
rule-let the shareholders decide-did not win out in state legisla­
tures, in courtrooms, or in private ordering schemes. 
In Part II, we provide our interpretation of what happened. Mar­
ket participants, faced with unsatisfactory law, can adapt in several 
ways. Put simply, they can try to change the law, opt out of the law, or 
work around the law. Each strategy has its own dynamics. We use this 
lens to analyze the market responses and nonresponses, and we con­
clude that the dominant mode of adaptation was through private 
mechanisms-what we will call "adaptive devices." 
Redux, 69 U Chi  L Rev 1037, 1064-ot> (2002) (arguing, as Lipton has since the 1970s. that the de­
cision whether to accept or reject an acquisition offer was primarily for the board of directors); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 Del J Corp L 
491, 507--09 (2001) ( arguing, as Gilson has since the 1980s, that the shareholders should decide 
whether to accept or reject a bid for cDntrol). 
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In Part III, we consider the implications of this analysis for un­
derstanding Delaware corporate law in general and takeover law in 
particular. The takeover experience emphasizes how the possibility of 
adaptive responses makes it very difficult to predict the effects of legal 
developments. At the same time, the Delaware takeover jurisprudence 
illustrates a deep preference in Delaware corporate law for bilateral 
rather than unilateral responses. This tilt towards consensus has impli­
cations both for the stability of particular responses and for Dela­
ware's position as the leading corporate domicile-effects that we ex­
plore in some detail. Finally, we return to poison pills and examine 
how the pill contributed to a new equilibrium that transformed the pill 
into a device that plausibly is in shareholders' interest and, in any 
event, one that shareholders can easily live with. We conclude with a 
discussion of the interaction of poison pills and staggered boards, and 
the danger that equilibria can become stale and entrenched. 
I. TAKEOVERS IN THE 1980s AND THEIR AFTERMATH 
A. The 1 980s 
During the 1980s, a huge takeover wave hit corporate America. 
As indicated in Table 1, M&A activity increased from $44 billion in 
1980 to $247 billion in 1988.2 A substantial portion of the deals during 
this period were hostile takeovers or defensive transactions under­
taken in response to hostile takeovers.3 
2 See Mergerstat, M &A Activiry- U.S. and U.S. Cross-Border Transactions (2001 ). avail-
able online at <http://www.mergerstat l.com/f rce_reports/f ree_reports_m_and_a_act ivi t y.asp> 
(visited Mar 31, 2002). 
3 Set.:. for example, City Capital Associatio11, LLP v lnterco, Inc, 551 A2d 787, �Ol-03 (Del 
Ch l988) (Jiscussing defensive recapitalization in response: to a hostile bid). 
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TABLE 1 
M&A ACTIVITY: 1980-88 
Year Deals Value($ bil) 
1980 1 ,889 $44.3 
1 981 2,395 $82.6 
1 982 2,533 $53.8 
1983 2,543 $73.1 
1984 2,543 $122.2 
1985 3,001 $179.8 
1 986 3,336 $173.1 
1 987 2,032 $163.7 
1 988 2,258 $246.9 
Source: Mergerstat. 
Whether the takeovers of the 1 980s enhanced overall economic 
efficiency is d isputed.4 What is clear, however, is that these t akeovers 
spawned substantial innovation in corporate legal doctrine5 and rein­
vigorated corporate legal schoJarship.6 Iv1ost of the doctrinal and 
scholarly focus was on the validity of so-called defensive tactics em­
ployed by target managers to fend off a hostile tender offer or, more 
generally, on the division of power between target managers and tar­
get shareholders in deciding whether the company· should be sold.7 In 
� See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 Yale J 
Reg 119, 122-54 ( 1 992) (providing a survey of the academic literature) . 
s See, for example, Jesse H. Choper, John C. Co ffee, Jr., and Ronald J. Gilson. Cases and 
Materials on Corporations 887-1079 (Aspen 4th ed 1995) (devoting almost 20% of the casebook 
to chapters on corporate acquisitions, t akeovers, and control transact ions) . 
6 See David \V. Leebron. Games Corporations ?lay: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 NYU L 
Rev 153,  J54 (1986) ("The nearly obligatory observation commencing any writing on the subject 
of tender offers is that no machination of the corporate or financial world has ever attracted 
greater attention from lawyers, legal scholars, financial economists. or the lay press."); Bayless 
Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker. 72 Yale L J 223, 245 
n 37 (1 962) (arguing, prior to the advent of takeo\'ers, that ·'corporation law. as a field of intellec­
tual effort, is dead in the United States''). 
7 See. for example, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner. Lockups and the Mark!!£ for 
Corporate Comrol, 48 Stan L Rev 1539, 1552-58. 1564-70 (1996) (arguing for strict judicial scru­
tiny of second-bidder lockups); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 
25 Wake Forest L Rev 37. 3lJ-46 (IY90) (examining the implications to shareholders and man­
agement of Rev/on analysis in the context of a hostile bid); Ronald J. Gilso!l and Reinier Kraak­
man, Delaware's lnrennedimc Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Sub.;illllt.:t! iO f>ropurtional­
iry Review?, 44 Bus Law 247, 248 {1989) (analyzing Delaware's "intermediate: standard of r..:-
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the early 1980s, target managers resorted to a variety of exotic sound­
ing defensive tactics, ranging from "shark repellants"8 to "greenmail,"9 
and from "white knights"10 to the "Pac-Man" defense.11 Quickly, how­
ever, a new weapon in the defensive arsenal-the "poison pill"­
rendered most other defenses moot. Compared to other defenses, the 
poison pill had several important advantages for target managers. A 
pill could be adopted by any company at any time without share­
holder approval;12 adoption of a pill did not entail significant transac­
tion costs and did not, apart from its effect on takeovers, affect the 
conduct of the company's b usiness; and, most importantly, a pill made 
a company takeover-proof unless redeemed by the target board.13 
view"); Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical A nalysis vf Corporate Green­
mail, 95 Yale L J 13, 60 (1985) (arguing "in favor of applying the traditional business judgment 
rule to challenges of greenmail payments"); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undiswrted Choice and 
Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv L Rev 1693, 1747--63 (1985) (proposing a 
scheme to address the problem of coercive offers); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in 
Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 Colum L Rev 249, 254-55 (1983) (proposing 
legislation that would permit shareholders to decide whether to approve management's response 
to a hostile bid); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv 
L Rev 1028, 1030 (1982) (supporting a rule of auctioneering); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
for Facilitating Competing Tender Of ers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan L Rev 23, 49 (1982) 
(favoring a rule that facilitates competing bids); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case against Shark Repel­
lent Amendments: Structural Limitmions on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan L Rev 774, 836 (1982) 
(arguing that state corporation statutes should be interpreted not to authorize "shark repellant" 
amendments-amendments to a target's articles of incorporation that make acquisition less de­
sirable and more difficult): Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk 
Co.m in Tender Offers. 35 Stan L Rev 1, 21 (1982) (bolstering their argument "that a no-auction 
rule maximizes the wealth of investors and society" in response to the criticism of Bebchuk and 
Gilson); Frank H. Easterbrook ami Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions. 91 Yale L 
J 698,715 (1982) (arguing that "(i]nvestors' welfare is maximized by a legal rule that p..:rmits un­
equal division of gains" from such transactions): Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. 
The Proper Role of a Target's i'l'fanagement in Respondi;zg to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 
1201 (1981) (arguing that shareholders would want management to be passive in the f::�ce of a 
lender offer); Ronald J. Gilson, A Strucrural Approach to Corpormions: The Case against Defen­
sive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan L Rev 819,865 (1981) (arguing that the "corporate structure 
assigns to sharehoiders the decisionrnaking role in tender offers'' and that managernent"s proper 
role in such situations is limited to "aid(ing] the shareholder in making the decision"); Martin 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom. 35 Bus Law 101, 105 (1979) (stating that "pro­
scribing the ability of companies to defend against takeovers would adversely affect long-term 
planning''). 
<'� See Gilson, 34 Stan L Rev at 777 (cited in note 7) (defining shark repellant amend-
ments). 
9 See Macey and McChesney. 95 Yale L 1 at B (cited in note 7) (defining. greenmail ::IS 
negotiated stock repurchases). 
Ill S..:..: Revlrm, liu.: v !'vla�Ami,·ews & Forbes Holding�; Inc. :i(J6 A2d 173, 183l0el l':ll>6) lUS­
ing the phrase to describe a bidder sought by a target to counter a disfavored bid). 
II See Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black. The Law and Finance of Corporare /lcctuisitiuns 
771-72 (Foundation 2J ed 1995) (4uoting a merger :;pecialist who stated that the defense oc­
curred when "my client eats yours before yours ..-:ats mine ''). 
12 See id at 747 (noting that ··[aJ central characteristic of a poison pill plan is that share­
holder approval is not required for <Jdoptit)n.'). 
13 See Marlm Lipton. Wachtcll, Lipton. Rosen & Kutz. i'vlemorandum to Clients (Jan 15. 
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Because any company could quickly create a poison pill and be­
cause a pill was so effective, the doctrinal and academic interest soon 
turned to the circumstances in which target managers could refuse to 
redeem the pill-and thereby prevent target shareholders from ac­
cepting a hostile tender offer.14 One question in particular was consid­
ered to be highly important by practitioners, academics, and courts 
alike: Could a target board (as recommended to the nation's youth by 
the then-First Lady) "just say no" and refuse to redeem a pill indefi­
nitely, based on its assertion that it believed in good faith that the hos­
tile bid was too low? It took the Delaware courts until the end of the 
1980s to address this issue authoritatively.15 During this period, promi­
nent legal scholars painted in dark colors the world in which a "just 
say no" defense was valid.16 For them, the power of shareholders to 
accept a takeover bid without board interference was a crucial ele-
1993) ("[The poison pill) is an absolute bar to a raider acquiring control of the company ... with­
out the approval of the company's board of directors."), quoted in Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote 
No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians inside the Gates, 45 Stan L Rev 857, 859 n 
4 (1993). 
14 See Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus Law at 256-60 (cited in note 7) (examining what con­
stitutes a "threat" that warrants a defensive response); lnterco, 551 A2d at 798 (finding ''that in 
the setting of a noncoercive offer, absent unusual facts, there may come a time when a board's 
fiduciary duty will require it to redeem the [pill) and to permit the shareholders to choose"). 
15 See text accompanying notes 21-31. 
l6 See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and U1ili1y of the Shareholder Rights 
Bylmv, 26 Hofstra L Rev 835, 837 {l998): 
Unfortunately, poison pills have become deal breakers. Courts have become far too reluc­
t<Jnt to second-guess directors who refuse to eiiminate their firms' pills. These courts are 
shirking their responsibility to safeguard shareholder value by failing to enforce fiduciary 
duties and by failing to police director and managemc:!nt conflicts of interest. Target firms 
can now keep their poison pills ir: place and ··just say no" to would-be acquirers, regardless 
of the market premiums these acquirers are willing to pay to shareholders. 
See also Grundfest , 45 Stan L Rev at 858, 862, 864 (cited in note 13): 
The takeover wars are over. Management won. Although hostile tender offers remain tech­
nically possible, the legal and financial barriers in their path are far higher today than they 
were a few short years ago. As a resul.t, it will be difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in 
wkeover battles, even if shareholders support the insurgents' efforts . . . . This remarkable 
transformation in the market for corporate control resulted from the emergence of the 
"poison pill" as an effective antitakeover device . . . .  With the demise of the hostile takeover. 
shareholders can no longer expect much help from the capital markets in disciplining or 
removing inefficient managers . .. .  As a result, corporate America is now governed by direc­
tors who are largely impervious to capital market or electoral challenges. 
See also Ronald J. Gilson. Seeking Competitive Bids versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer De­
feme. 35 St2n L Rev 5 1 , 52 (1982): 
[T]here is no coherent justification for allowing target management to engage in defensive 
tactics that may deprive sharc:!holders of the opportunity to tender their shares. Corporate 
managers musi face up to the fact that such conduct bendits only themselves. State courts 
must recognize that the legal rules that facilitate this conduct, under the guise of deference 
to business judgment, do no more than sanction corporate treason. 
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ment of a well-functioning system of corporate governance.17 Epito­
mizing this view, Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman de­
scribed the question of whether target managers could preclude 
shareholders from accep6ng a noncoercive bid because they believed 
that the price was inadeq uate as the "single most important issue" in 
takeover law.18 On the flip side of the coin, when a ruling by the Dela­
ware Chancery Court appeared to reject the "just say no" defense, '� 
Martin Lipton of Wachtell,  Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a leading M&A law 
firm, sent a notorious memorandum to his clients characterizing the 
ruling as a "dagger aimed at the hearts of all Delaware corporations" 
and advising them that they might have to consider reincorporating in 
a different state.20 A lot, it appeared, turned on the validity of the de­
fense. 
Beleaguered target managers thus must have breathed a collec­
tive sigh of relief when the Delaware Supreme Court issued its opin­
ion in Paramount Communications, Inc v Time, Inc ("Time- vVarner") .21 
In Time-Warner, the court permitted the board of Time, faced with a 
hostile, conditional tender offer by Paramount, to proceed with its 
own tender offer for Warner Brothers and to retain its poison pill .22 
The decision of Time's board was based on the opinion, shared by the 
board's outside directors and supported by a fairness opinion by 
Time's investment bank, that Paramount's conditional offer of $200 
per share-a 58% premium over Time's pre-offer share price-was 
inadequate.23 W ithout closer scrutiny of the reasonableness of the de­
cision and the process in which it was reached. the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that "( d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately 
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless 
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy,"14 and cr iti­
cized the earlier Chancery Court decision that stimulated Lipton's 
memorandum as a "narrow and rigid" interpretation of Delaware 
law.25 
17 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Lmv 171-74 (Harvard 1991) (discussing the importance of tenJer offers and the 
prohibition of target resistance for controlling agency costs): Gilson. 33 Stan L Rev at 841--48 
(cited in note 7) (describing the tender offer as having a critical role in the corporal<! structure 
and explaining why defensive tactics undermine t h at role). 
IS Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus Law at 25R (cited in note 7). 
19 flllerco, 551 A2d at 798. 
20 See Jeffrey N. Gordon. Corporatiom; Markets. and Cuuns. 91 Colum L Rev 1931. J 959 
n 95 (1991) (quot ing from the memorandum). 
21 571 A2d 1140 (Del1989 ). 
22 Seeid at 1 14l. 
23 Sec id at 1 1:19. 
24 ld at 1 154. 
25 Id at 1153. 
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Most commentators have read Time-¥Varner to fortify t he power 
of a board to "just say no."26 To be sure, even after Time-Warner, some 
limits on the target board's ability to "just say no" exist. Delaware 
courts may be more skeptical of an assertion that a price offered in a 
hostile bid is inadequate if this assertion does not enjoy the support of 
the board's outside directors or if  the board failed to obtain a fairness 
opinion.27 Furthermore, once a change in control is inevitable, a t arget 
can no longer "just say no" to a competing bidder.28 Finally, despite its 
sweeping language, Ti1ne-Warner involved peculiar facts that could be 
used by future court opinions to limit its holding.2" Despite these cave­
ats, however, outside Revlon,J<' no Delaware case after Time-Warner 
has suggested that a board may have to redeem a poison pil l  if the in­
dependent directors, with the advice of an investment bank,  conclude 
that a hostile bid is too low.31 
B.  The Aftermath 
Merger and acquisition activity declined sharply around the time 
of the Time-Warner decision and in its immediate aftermath, with the 
decline in hostile acquisitions being particularly pronounced. As indi­
cated in Table 2, the value of M&A deals fell from its 1988 peak of 
$247 bil lion, to $221 billion in 1989, to $108 billion in 1990, and then to 
26 See, for example. Marcel Kahan, PaFamount or Paradox: The Delaware S<tpreme Court�· 
Takeover l11risprudcnce. 19 J Corp L 583,604 ( l994) (arguing that Delaware law validates the use 
of the poison pill to ··just say no"): Grundfest. 45 Stan L Rev at 859 n 4 (cited in note 13) (con­
cluding that most commentators tle lieve that Time- Warner greatly strengthened the board's abil­
ity to reject a noncoercive bid): Gordon. 91 Colum L Rev at 1932 (cited in note 20) (noting that 
Time-Warner "came close tc explicit ly sanctioning a ·just say no· defense'"); Theodore N. Mirvis, 
Time/Warner: The Delaware Supreme C{)lm Speaks, NY Law J 5. 6 (Mar 29. 1990) (''(T)he opin­
ion is an undeniable endorsement uf 'Just Say No' where the decision not to redeem the pill is 
made in good faith and on a11 infor111ed basis.''); James C. Freund and Rodman Ward, Jr., What 's 
'In,' 'Ow' in Takeovers in Wakt' of Paramount v. Time. Natl L J 22, 25 (Mar 26, 1990) ("The 'just 
say no' defense is ddinitely looking better and better.") . 
27 See Kahan, 19 J Corp L at 605 (cited in note 26) (noting that a decision to reject an offer 
will be analyzed according to certain iactors. including whether the decision was supported by 
the independent directors and whether the board had adequate information). 
28 See Paramount Conununications, Inc v Q VC Netll'ork, Inc, 637 A2cl 34. 4R (Del 1993) 
(holding that when a corporation undertakes a transaction that will cause a change in corporate 
control, the directors· obligation is to seek •he best value available tu the shareholders). 
29 Jn QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court retreated from portions of tht: Time-'vi'amer 
opinion, explaining when a target h'ard is subject t0 Rev/on duties. Id at 47 I stating that the de­
fendants had ''misread the holding r,f Time- Warner" and going on to emphasize that a breakup 
did not need to be inevitabk before Rev/on dulies were triggered) . Until now. however. no 
Delaware case has limited tht· portions of Time- Warner that deal with the permissibility of the 
"just say no" defense. 
30 Redan, Inc I' .\/ ac/\ndrea·s & Forbes Holdings, fnc. 506 A 2<1 ! 71 (Del 1 1.)�6 ). 
Jl Sec, for examplt:. Uni:rin. Inc v A merican General Corp. 65! A:?.d !361. 1375-76 (Del 
J 995) ( uphoiJing tht: us..: of dt:knsivc measu;cs hy a target board in su•;h circt•msumces). 
! 
( 
( 
f 
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$71 billion in 1991.32 The level of hostile acquisition in that period de­
clined by over 90%.33 This downturn was attributed to several causes: a 
slowdown in the economy, the collapse of the junk bond market, and 
last but not least, the enhanced level of takeover protection offered by 
corporate law.34 The decline thus seemed to validate the views of 
scholars and practitioners about the significance of "just say no." 
TABLE 2 
M&A ACTIV1TY: 1988-1991 
Year Deals Value($ bil) 
1988 2,258 $246.9 
1 989 2,366 $22 1 . 1  
1990 2,074 $108.2 
1991 1 ,877 $71.2 
Source: .Mergerstat. 
The dip in takeovers, however, turned out to be short-lived. As 
indicated in Table 3, M&A activity reached unprecedented levels as 
the economy rebounded.35 By 1995, the level of M &A activity ex­
ceeded the previous 1988 record.  In the millennia! year 2000, it 
reached a volume of $1 .285 trillion on over ten thousand deals, thus 
topping activity in 1988 by over 400% in dollar terms and by over 
300% in the number of deals.36 
32 See Mergerstat, iH &A Activity (cited in note 2). 
33 Hostilt! acquisitions feli [rom almost $l27 billion in 1 YSK. to about $45.5 billion in 1989, 
to a little more than $11 billion in 1990. Securities Data Co. Tile !991 Domestic Merger Yearbook 
9 ( l991). 
34 See. for example. G rundfest. 45 Stan L Rev at 858 (cit.:d in note 13) (claiming that the 
end of the ''takeover wars·· resulted ·'from the emergence of th...: 'poison pill' . . state antit�ke­
over statutes. and the development of financial market conditions inimical to hostile control con­
tests"). Gordon. 91 Colum L R.:v at 1931-32 (cited in not<! 20) (listing these among causc:s for 
the decline in acquisition activity). 
35 See. for example. Paul M. Sh·�r.:r. Rc:l'it:IV uf iv!arke:s: T/11: Lesson from Chrysler, Ciricurp 
and Mobil: No Cumpanic:s Nun·adays Are Tuu Bi15 ru Mergc:. Wall St J RS (Jan 4. 1999) (noting 
that ill eve ry y.:ar sine.: 1995. the volume and value or U.S. deals .:xcecded previous records). 
Jt; Se.: MergL!rstat, M&;\ ;luiviry (citL!d in note 2). 
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TABLE 3 
M&A ACTIVITY: 1990-2000 
Year Deals Value ($ bil) 
1990 2,074 $108.2 
1991 1,877 $71.2 
1992 2,574 $96.7 
1993 2,663 $176.4 
1 994 2,997 $226.7 
1995 3,510 $356.0 
1996 5,848 $495.0 
1997 7,800 $657.1 
1998 7,809 $1,192.9 
1 999 9,278 $1,425.9 
2000 10,883 $1 ,284.8 
Source: Mergerstat. 
The revival of takeovers was accompanied by several other 
changes, both in the structure of takeovers and corporate governance 
and in academic thinking. Hostile bids continued to be made. Re­
sponding to the "just say no" defense, such bids either were accompa­
nied by the threat of a proxy contest to replace the incumbent board37 
or were instituted after the target agreed to be acquired by another 
company.38 Contrary to the 1980s, however, the vast majority of take­
over bids in the second part of the 1990s were nominally friendly.w 
But at the same time as the composition of bids shifted, the line 
between "friendly bids" and "hostile bids," both in the eyes of practi­
tioners and academics, became blurred. In the 1980s, renowned hostile 
takeover artists such as T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, and Ronald 
Perelman were viewed as making "financial" and "bust-up" hostile 
bids (so-called because of the lack of obvious synergies between the 
bidder and the target and the bidder's plan to sell off non-core assets 
37 The ne11· board could then redeem the poison pill and l<.!t the bid go forward. 
38 Having agreed to a sale or a change of control, the target company could not use a poi­
son pill to block a hostile bid at a higher price. See QVC. 637 A2d at :.IS: note 28. 
39 Joseph H. Flum, 1\-Jergers & At.:,Jlli�itions: The Det.:ade in Review. 5.J U Miami L Rev 753, 
761-62 (2000) (noting that the number of hostile transactions was small in comparison with the 
total number of transactions). 
( ) 
I 
( 
I 
\ I 
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to repay debt incurred in the acquisition):" One of the best known 
takeover law firms, Wachtell, Lipton, categorically refused to repre­
sent hostile bidders:� Academics, in turn, sharply distinguished be­
tween hostile bids, designed primarily to discipline target managers 
and replace them with a different management team, and friendly 
bids, designed to generate synergies.42 But by the late 1990s, both 
friendly and hostile bids were regularly made by Fortune 500 compa­
nies in related industries;·3 Wachtell, Lipton had represented hostile 
bidders in some of the most widely-known takeover battles;44 and aca­
demics had started to view friendly and hostile bids as reflecting tenu­
ous distinctions in negotiating strategies and in the timing of the dis­
closure of takeover talks.45 
Accompanying the shift in types of takeovers and the blurring 
distinction between them are two other gradual changes in the gov­
ernance structure for public corporations. First, both anecdotal evi­
dence and empirical studies suggest that outside directors exert more 
power in the boardroom than they did previously. Several studies find 
that the percentage of outside directors on corporate boards has in­
creased.40 While in the 1960s boards had a majority of inside directors,�7 
40 See Moran v Household International, Inc, 490 A2d 1059, 1064 (Del Ch 1985) (noting the 
argument that the pill is designed to deter hostile, bust-up bids). 
41 See Edward Felsenthal, Raiders ' Enemy in '80s Takes Surprising Path, Wall St J B8 (Nov 
19, 1993) (noting that the decision by Wachteil, Lipton. Rosen & Katz to represent QVC in its 
hostile takeover bid for Paramount was a reversal of its former policy that hostile takeovers 
were destroying companies and undermining the U.S. economy). 
42 See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1 169-73 (cited in note 7) 
(arguing that hostile bids are motivated by a desire to replace target management); Gilson, 33 
Stan L Rev at 841-45 (cited in note 7) (viewing tender offers as prime mechanism to replace in­
efficient or self-dealing management); Randall Morek, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 
Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in Alan J. Auerbach, ed, Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 101.  104-26 (Chicago 1 988) (providing empirical evidence 
that hostile takeovers are disciplinary, while friendly takeovers are synerg.istic). 
43 See, for example, G£ Seeks Kemper Shareholder List, Chi Sun-Times 45 (Mar 22, 1994) 
(noting GE's hostile bid for Kemper); Northrop 10 Launch !-loslile Offer for Grumman , UP! 
(Mar 10, 1 994); NCR Corp Responds to AT&T Ojfer, Bus Wire (Dec 5,  1990). See also Flom, 54 
U Miami L Rev at 761-62 (cited in note 39) (noting that a number of major firms, such as GE, 
AT&T, and IBM, engaged in hostile takeover activity in the 1990s). 
44 See Fclsenthal, Raiders' Enemy in "80s Takes Surprising Path, \Vall St J at B8 {cited in 
note 41) (noting that the firm has represented QYC and AT&T in hostile takeover bids). 
45 See, for example, G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Be­
holder?, 55 J Fin 2599, 2601-38 (2000) ( finding empirical evidence that hostile anJ friendly deals 
are not distinguishable in economic terms. except that hostilt: transactions involve publiciiy as 
part of the hugaining process); Rohert Daines and Michael Klausner, Do !PO Chart�rs Maxi­
mize Firm Values?: Antiwkeover Protectio!l in lPOs, 17 1 L, Econ, & Org R3, 98 (2001)  (noting 
that friendly and hostile transactions are '·substitutt.:s"'). 
46 See, for example, Sanj ai Bh<tgat and Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship hetween 
Board Composilion and Finn Performarzc,:, 54 Bus Law 921, 922, 940-50 ( 1 999) (reporting an in­
creased percentage of outside directors); James Kristic, Board Trends 1970s tu 1hr: 1990s: "' Tit<' 
More Things Change . . .  ," presentation to the Institutional Shareholder Services Annual Client 
Conkrence ( Feb 26, 1999), available online:: at <htip://www.dircctors;.�ndboards.comf 
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a survey of board composition in 1999 reports that the average board 
consists of nine outside and only two inside directors:s The increase in 
the percentage of outside directors seems particularly pronounced in 
companies incorporated in states that have adopted severe antitake­
over laws:9 Moreover, outside directors are not mere lackeys of man­
agement. Several studies based on pre-1990 data document ,  among 
other things,5" that outside directors make it more likely that poorly 
performing CEOs are fired;51 that they enhance shareholder wealth 
during tender offers;52 that they reduce the extent to which CEOs are 
rewarded for luck;53 that their appointment is associated with an in­
crease in the stock pricet and that majority-independent boards are 
associated with higher premia in management buyoutS.55 More recent 
data suggest that outside directors have increasing influence over the 
brdtrnds.html> (visited Mar 28, 2002) (reporting the increasing percentage of outside directors). 
47 See Bhagat and Black, 54 Bus Law at 921 (cited in note 46) ("In the 1960s, most ( Ameri­
can public companies] had a majority of inside directors."). 
48 Korn/Ferry International, 27th Annual Board of Directors Study (2000). See also Mark 
R. Huson, Robert Parrino, and Laura T. Starks, Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and C EO Turn­
over: A Long· Term Perspective. 56 J Fin 2265, 2276 (2001) (reporting that the mean number of 
non-officer directors has increased from 65.9% in 1971-1976 to 76.5% in 1 989-1994). 
49 See Chun-Kcung Hoi, Jeffrey Lessard, and Ashok Robin, The Effect of State A nti­
Takeover Laws on Board C omposition, 18 Am Bus Rev 9, 13- 1 7  (2000) (examining the board 
composition of Ohio and Pennsylvania companies and finding that the proportion of outside di­
rectors in companies incorporated in these states i ncreased at a higher rate than in companies 
incorporated in other states). 
so For an overview of these studies, see generally Bhagat and Black, 54 Bus Law at 921 
(cited in note 46). 
5 1  See Michaei S. Weisbach, Outside Direcwrs and CEO 11mwver. 20 J Fin Econ 431,  458 
(1988) (concluding that ·'performance measures are more highly correlated with CEO turnover 
for firms in which outsiders dominate the boards''); Rick Geddes and Hrishikesh D. Yinod, CEO 
Tenure, Board Composition and Regulation at 25. working paper (1998), available online at 
<http://papers.ssrn.comlid=139266> (visited Mar 28, 2002) (finding .. shorter tenures for CEOs on 
outsider dominated boards"). See also Kenneth A. Borokhovich. Robert Parrino, and Teresa 
Trapani , Owside Directors and CEO Selection, 31 J Fin & Quant Anal 337, 346-53 (1990) (find­
ing, based on 1970 t0 1988 data, that the percentage of outside di rectors is positively related to 
outside CEO succession and that shareholders benefit from outside succession). 
52 See James F. Cotter, Ani! Shivdasani, and Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors En­
hance Target Shareh11lder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J Fin Econ 195, 216 ( 1 997) (using 
1989 to 1992 duta and concluding that outside directors are more likely to resist bids to extract 
higher premi a than w entrench management). 
53 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do C EO�· Set Their Own Pay? The 
Ones Without Princitwis Do at 27, MIT Working Paper No 00-26 (Jan 2000), available online at 
<http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7fi04.pdf> (vi>ited Apr 19 .  2002) (finding that insider presence 
on a board increased pay for luck). 
5� St:e Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Owside Directors, Bnard lndepend,;nce, and 
Shareholder Wealth. 26 J Fin Econ 175. 1 90 ( 1 990) (concluding that ''the addition of an outside 
director increases firm value"). 
55 Sec Chun 1. Lee, et <tl, Board Composirion and Slwrehofd,,r W�:a/;h: The> Case of Mnn­
agemem Buyows, Fin Mgmt 58, 71 (Spring 1992) (concluJing that "boards dominated by indt!­
p�nd�nt m�mbcrs an; associated with larger abnonna! returns'' in manngcment buyouts). 
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composition of board committees;sn that they dominate the composi­
tion of board committees, including the nominating committee;57 and 
that CEO tenure has declined and CEO terminations have in­
creasedsx - a  trend attributed, at least in part, to more independent 
boards.5y Consistent with these data, corporate governance experts 
have concluded that boards have become more effective monitors 
during the 1990s.60 As a result of the increasing number and increasing 
56 See Korn/Ferry International, press release, Komi Ferry's 28th Annual Board of Direcwrs 
Study Finds CEO, Board Evaluations on Upswing, Owsiders Deciding Commillee Membership, 
Compensation Static (2001), available online at <http://www.kornferry.com/pr/ 
pr_Ol_0904_board_evaluations.asp> (visited Mar 28. 2002) (reporting that the percentage of re­
spondents saying that the CEO chose committee chairs and members declined from 57% in 1996 
to 37% in 2001); Kristie, Board Trends 1970s to the 1990s (cited in note 46) (reporting that direc­
tors believe that it will become accepted practice for boards, rather than CEOs, to appoint 
committee members and chairs). 
57 See Korn/Ferry International, 27Ih Annual Board of Directors Srudy (2000) (cited in 
note 48) (finding that, with respect to eleven types of committees surveyed, seven types­
including the nominating committee-are on average composed only of outside directors, three 
types have insider directors who are a minority of the committee members, and one type (the 
executive committee) has the same number of outside and insider directors). See also Ani! 
Shivdasani and David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board J'v/ernbers: An 
Empirical Analysis, 54 J Fin 1829, 1 85 1  ( 1999) (reporting that the inOuence of CEOs over board 
members has declined); Kristie. Board Trends 1970s to the 1990s (cited in note 46) (reporting that 
the percentage of companies with nominating commiltees increased from 2% in i 973, to 60% in 
1 988. to 75% in 1999). 
5� See Tom Neff and Dayton Ogden, Anatomy of a CEO, Chief Executive 30, 31 (Feb 
2001) (reporting that median tenure of CEOs in office declined from seven years in 1980 to five 
years in 2000): Huson, Parrino. and Starks, 56 J Fin at 2278-79 (cited in note 48) (finding an in­
crease in forced CEO turnover in the 1971 to l l)l)4 period): Denis B.K. Lyons, CEO Casualties: A 
Barrlefrom Report, Directors & Boards 43 (Summer 1999) (reporting that the percentage of For­
tune lOU companies with CEOs with tenure of five years or less increased from 46% in 1 980 to 
58% in 1 998); CEO Turnover Up. SF Bus Times (July 6, 2001), available online at 
<http:/ /san francisco. bizj ou rnals.com/sa n f rancisco/s tories/200 1/07/02/da ily32. h tml > (visited Mar 
29, 2002) (reporting increase in turnover in Fortune 1000 companies); Drake Beam Morin, CEO 
1ltrnover and Job Securily 8 (Special Report 2000) (finding "increased turnover and job loss at 
the highest corporate level'' in an international study); Lorri G rube, CEOs at Risk, Chief Execu­
tive 42 (Nov l ,  1995) (reporting that executive turnover increased by more than a fourth be­
tween 1992 and 1995). 
59 See Lyons, CEO Casualties: A Barrlefront Report, Directors & Boards at 43 (cited in note 
58) (listing "increasingly independent boards" as the first factor contributing to a "rash of leader­
ship changes'"); CEO 1itmnver Up. SF Bus Times (cited in note 58) ("CEO tenures <:�re being cut 
short by impatient boards of directors and by unforgiving public markets"); Grube, Chief Execu­
tive at 42 (Nov 1, 1995) (cited in note 58) (''[I]ncreasingly powerful boards [ ] are impatient with 
subpar performance.''). But see lViorin . CEO Tttmuver and Job Security at 12 lcited in note 58) 
(conducting an international study finding that mergers anJ acquisitions are leading cause for 
CEO departure and th:lt le�s than !0% of departures are due to di�mis"al or re�ign<ltinn): Huson. 
Parrino. and Starks. 56 J Fin at 226�. 227X (cited in note 48) (finding statistical evidence that the 
percentage of outside directors increased between 1971 and 1994, the larger percentage of out­
side directors increases the likelihood nf forced CEO turnover, and that, controlling for govern­
ance changes, likelihood of a forced CEO turnover was higha during 1989 to 1994 than in earlier 
periods). 
60 See. for example, Mark J. Lo•.:wenstein, The Conundmm of Execwive Cnmpt:nsarion, 35 
Wake Forest L R\.:V 1 ,  15-16 (2000) (nc:t i •1g the im.:reasing indcpcnJencc of board m<:mbers); TuJ 
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independence of outside directors, target CEOs can no longer assume 
that outside board members will support their decision to reject an 
unsolicited bid. 
Second, and more visibly, the executive compensation structure 
has evolved to include an increasing reliance on stock options. Con­
sider the following data: In 1980, less than one,. third of U.S. CEOs held 
stock options.61 By 1995, more than two-thirds of public companies 
compensated their CEOs with stock options.62 Among large compa­
nies, where direct equity stakes tend to be lower, stock options are 
even more prevalent. According to a 1996 study, a staggering 94% of 
the largest 250 companies use stock options as part of their compensa­
tion packages.63 In relation to the dollar value of overall CEO com­
pensation, stock options, which accounted for a trifling 8% in 1985,64 
had by 1998 risen to 35% of a CEO's compensation in public compa­
nies overall, and to 38% of the compensation of CEOs of Standard & 
Poor's ("S&P") 500 companies.65 Executives can reap substantial fi­
nancial benefits from stock options when their company is acquired in 
a premium bid. These benefits are multiplied by golden parachutes, 
which provide for severance payments, benefits, early vesting of pen­
sion rights, and accelerated vesting of unvested options."' 
Perry and Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder 
Expropriation?, 35 Wake Forest L Rev 123, 130 (2000) (concluding that directors may have be­
come more vigilant monitors of CEOs); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 
99 Colum L Rev 1253, 1266 ( 1 999) (noting increased level of directorial care over and rise of the 
monitoring boards during the 1990s); Ira M. Millstein and Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of 
Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, Y8 Colum L Rev 1283, 
1284-86 ( 1998) (noting the increased independence of boards). 
11 1  See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U Cin L Rev 1021, 1029 { 1 999) {observing that the percentage of 
CEOs holding stock options increased from 30% to almost 70% from 1980 to 1 994). For a gen­
eral discussion of the increased use of stock options in executive compensation, see Marcel Ka­
han, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U Pa L Rev 1869, 188R-
90 (2000) (noting that 94% of the 250 largest U.S. companies use stock options as part of their 
compensation packages). 
62 See Perry and Zenner, 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 1 29-30 (cited in note 60) (noting that. 
by 1995. the percentage of companies compensating their CEOs through stock options was up to 
70%). 
63 See Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for 
Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 Stan J L, Bus, & Fin 31 ,  42 { 1 997) (citing a 
1996 study by Frederick W. Cook & Co .. Inc.). 
64 See Linda 1. Barris, The Overcompensmion Problem: A Collective Approach w Control­
lin}; Eucwivt: ray, 68 Ind L J 59, 64 (1992). 
65 See Perry and Zenner, 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 131 (cited in note 60). See also David 
Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Srock Optiom Effectively?, 39 J Fin Econ 237. 238 
{1995) (reporting an increase in the percentage of CEO compensation accounted for by stock 
options from 20% in 1984 to 30% in 1991 ). 
60 See Ehud Kamar, ivianagaial Change-in-Cowrol Benefits and Tak11ova� at -l. working 
paper (2001 ) (on file with authors) (examining the effect of stock options and early vesting on 
incentives to pursue a sale of the company ). 
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Equally noteworthy are the governance changes that did not oc­
cur. Market participants made relatively few efforts to constrain the 
use of poison pills and the power of the board to "just say no." Ac­
cording to conventional wisdom, managerial incentives to include effi­
cient governance devices are strongest for companies that go public.�7 
But a study of charter provisions in over three hundred companies 
that went public between 1 994 and 1997 found no single provision that 
prohibited or limited the use of poison pills or the board's authority to 
adopt anti takeover provisions in the future.68 To the contrary, a major­
ity _of firms included provisions that rendered takeovers more difficult 
than they would have been in a company with just a pill. Perhaps most 
tellingly, over 60% of the companies went out of their way to protect 
the board's ability to wield a poison pill by either establishing a stag­
gered board or by making it difficult for shareholders to replace the 
board between annual meetings.6� A staggered board renders a hostile 
bidder's conventional response to a pill-the waging of a proxy con­
test concurrent with a tender offer, with a newly elected board re­
deeming the pill- more difficult since a bidder may have to wage 
proxy contests in two consecutive years to obtain a board majority. 
Similarly, under Delaware corporate law, when there is a staggered 
board the default setting for director removal between annual meet­
ings shifts from "with or without cause" to "only for cause."7" If share­
holders cannot replace the board between annual meetings, a raider 
has to wait until the annual meeting to conduct the proxy contests and 
consummate its bid. 
With respect to companies that are already public, the evidence 
on opt-outs is somewhat more ambiguous. According to data compiled 
by Georgeson, a major proxy solicitation firm, shareholders, in the 
early years of the pill, sponsored a moderate number of precatory 
resolutions -an average of twenty-six per year during 1987 to 1991 -
asking the board to redeem the pill or to submit it to a shareholder 
vote.7' Since then, the number of such resolutions has declined to an 
average of less than fifteen a year during 1996 to 2000.72 The Investor 
67 See, for example, Daines and Klausner, 1 7  J L, Econ, & Org at 85 (cited in note 45) (not­
ing the common assumption that !PO-stage charter terms maximize firm value). 
68 See id at 95. 
69 E-mail from Michael Klausner to Marcel Kahan (Aug 29, 2001) (reporting that 62.3% of 
the companies in the Daines-K!Jusner sampl e  established a staggered board, prohibited rc:moval 
of directors without cause, or did not gi ve shareholdcrs the right to call a special meeting or to 
act by written consent) .  
70 8 Del Code Ann § 141 (k) ( 1 991) .  
7 1  See Georgeson Shareholder, Inc. 2000 Annual lvfeeting Season Wmp-Up: Corporate 
Guvemance 3 figure 2, available online at <htqJ://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/ 
OOWrapup.pdf> (visited Mar 29, 2002). 
72 See id. 
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Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") similarly reports a decline 
in the number of poison pill resolutions from twenty-one per year per 
one thousand firms during 1987 to 1991 to ten per year during 1996 to 
2000.73 On the other hand, both Georgeson and the IRRC find that the 
percentage of shareholder voting in favor of pill resolutions increased, 
from 27% (39%) during 1987 to 1991 to 42% (57%) during 1996 to 
2000.74 Even resolutions that were approved by shareholders, however, 
generally did not result in the removal of a pill.75 Perhaps at odds with 
the IPO data,76 shareholders have voted in increasing number for reso-
73 See Michael Klausner, lnsticutional Shareholders' Split Personality on C orporate Gov­
ernance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IPOs at 3, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper 225 (Nov 2001) ,  available online at <http://papers.ssrn.comlid=292083> (visited 
Mar 29, 2002). See also Stuart L. Gillian and Laura T. Starks, Corporale Governance Proposals 
and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J Fin Econ 275, 286 (2000) (re­
porting that the number of poison pill resolutions declined between 1991 and 1 994). 
74 See Georgeson Shareholder, Inc, 1997 Annual Meeting Wrap- Up: Corporate Governance 
7 fig 10, available online at <http://georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/97Wrapup.pdf> (visited Mar 
29, 2002); Georgeson Shareholder, Inc, 2001 Annual J\tleeting Wrap-Up: Corporate Governance 7 
fig 10, available online at <http://georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/01 Wrapup. pdf> (visited Mar 29. 
2002). Some of the more recent proposals have been directed against dead-hand, rather than 
plain, poison pills. See T!AA-CREF Urges Nasdaq, NYSE to Require Shareholder Approval of 
Option Plans; Other 2001 Corporate Governance Initiatives Also Announced, PR Newswire (Feb 
7. 2001)  (noting resolutions filed by TIAA-CREF to have dead-hand pill repealed). The Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, using a different method to track shareholder proposals, simi­
larly finds that the number of poison pill proposals decreased from over fifty per year in  1990 
and 1991 to an average of twenty-two per year in !996 to 1 998. See various issues of Investor Re­
sponsibility Rsrch Center Corp Gov Bull. During this period, shareholders have made only 
minimal efforts to get companies to adopt charter provisions- allowing shareholders to act by 
written consent or to call special shareholder meetings and making directors removable without 
cause- that would permit the replacement of directors between annual meetings and thus 
greatly reduce the effect of a pill. See various issues of Investor Responsibility Rsrch Ctr Corp 
Gov Bull (describing two proposals between 1990 and 1998). 
75 See Council of Institutional Investors. 1998 t\1/ajority Vote Companies, available online at 
<http://www.cii.org/majvote98.htm> (visited Jan 5 ,  2002) (reporting that, of four companies 
where pill proposal was approved by a majority of shareholders, none implemented the pro­
posal); Council of Institutional Investors, 1999 Majority Vote Companies, available online at 
<http://www.cii.org/majvote99.htm> (visited Jan 5,  2002) ( reporting that. of nineteen companies 
where pill proposal was approved by a majority of shareholders, seven implemented the pro­
posal); Council of Institutional Investors. 2000 Majority Vote Companies. available online at 
<http://www.cii.org/majvoteOO.htm> (visited Jan 5, 2002) (reporting that, of eighteen companies 
where pill proposal was approved by a majority of shareholders, two implemented the proposal); 
Council of Institutional Investors, 2001 Majority Vote Companies, available online at 
<http://www.cii .orgimajvoteOl.htm> (visited Jan 5, 2002) (reporting that. of nineteen companies 
where pill proposal was approved by a majority of shareholders, two implemented the proposal); 
Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from Ca/PERS. 51 J 
Fin 227, 234 (1996) (finding that of twenty-three anti · pill proposals made by Ca!PERS from 1987 
to 1993, one was adopted or resulted in a settlement). Note that the seven pill proposals from 
1999 that were implemented included one mandatory bylaw amendmeni and at lea�t two pro­
posals concerning dc8.d-hand pills. As discussed below. shareholders have been more successful 
in getting boards to repeal dead-hand pills, which arc much more pokni than regular pills in 
fending off takeovers. See also text accompanying note l l 2. 
76 111e refusal of shareholders to vote for staggered boards can be rc:conciled with the in­
clusion of staggered boards in IPO charters. For example_ staggered boards may be desirable for 
t 
s 
1: 
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1utions calling on the board to propose declassification of existing 
staggered boards77 and, since the 1990s, have largely succeeded m re­
sisting charter amendments to establish staggered boards.1" 
II. OUR INTERPRETATION 
A. The Domain of Strategic Responses 
Assume, arguendo, that many market participants disapprove of 
the takeover standards set by the Delaware courts. There are three 
some companies (those that include such provisions i n  their IPO charters), but not for others 
(mature companies that do not have them already). 
77 See Georgeson Shareholder, Inc, Annual Meeting Wrap- Up governance reports (various 
years) (cited in notes 7 1 ,  74) (reporting that the average annual number of resolutions increased 
from less than one during 1987 to 1991 to twenty-three during 1996 to 2000 and percentage vot­
ing in favor increased from 27% in 1 994 to an average of 44% between 1998 and 2000); Klaus­
ner, Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality at 3-4 (cited in note 73) (presenting IRRC data 
showing that average number of staggered board proposals per one thousand firms was twenty­
seven a year during 1987 to 1991, with on average 22.5% of shareholders voting in favor: and 
thirteen a year during 1996 to 2000, with on average 46.7% of shareholders voting in favor); Gil­
lan and Starks, 57 J Fin Econ 275,286 (cited in note 73) (reporting that the number of resolutions 
to repeal classified boards remained steady between 1989 and 1994, but the number of such reso­
lutions sponsored by institutional investors or coordinated shareholder groups increased sub­
stantially). 1l1e relatively greater willingness of shareholders to accept antitakeover provisions in 
IPOs than in midstream amendments was accompanied by (and maybe caused) a shift in aca­
demic opinion about the relative efficiency of the !PO and the amendment process. In the 1980s, 
the leading proponents of the "let shareholders decide" approach to takeovers also regarded the 
governance provisions adopted in lPOs as more renective of what maximized shareholder value 
than the provisions that shareholders approved in ·'midstream" charter amendments. See. for ex­
ample, Lucian Aryc Bebchuk. Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corpurate Low: The Desirahle 
Constraints on Charter A111endments, 102 Harv L Rev 1820, 1812-25 ( 1 989) (favoring strickr lim­
its on midstream changes in charter terms but basically favoring contractual freedom in TPO 
terms); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate LaiV. 89 Colum L Rev 1549. 
1553-55, 1557-62 (1989) (same); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The 
Relevance of Substitwes. 73 Va L Rev 807, 808-10 ( 19�7). But see Roberta Romano. Answering 
the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for J'vlandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum L Rev 1599. 
1607-1 1 ( 1 989) (criticizing argument that shareholders blindly vote according to management 
recommendations). Since then. the faith in shareholder vot ing decisions seems to have increased 
remarkably and the terms included in IPO charters are regarded as Jess convincing evidence of 
what maximizes shareholder wealth. Nowadays, the same academics who argued against mid­
stream shareholder votes in the 1980s want to rely on shareholder votes to remove takeover bar­
riers. despite the fact that no takeover enhancing provisions are included in lPO charters. See 
Gi lson, 26 Del J Corp L at 507-09 (cited in note I )  (fa,·oring shareholder ability to adopt bylaws 
removing pills): Bebchuk .  69 U Chi L Rev at 980. 988. 1028 (cited in note 1 )  (advocating judicial 
invalidation of pill once shareholders have replaced a mjnority of a staggered board).  
78 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell. A Ne1v ;\pproach to Takeover Law and 
Regulawry CompPiition. f/.7 Va L Rev I 1 1 .  l20-2R (2()01 )  (noting tht�t  .. thn.;e rnmpan it"s tht�t did 
not already have classified boards at the start of the I 990s have found it practically impossible to 
gel the necessary shareholder approval of any charter amendmen t adc•pting a classified board"): 
Klausner. Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality nt 3-1 (cited in note 73) (presenting I R RC 
data showing that number of board proposals to amend the charter to establish a staggered 
hoard per one thousand firms has declined by about 90% from I Y86 l n  2000. and J ttributing de· 
cline to management's r·�alization that shareholders a r c  unl ikely to vote in favor of such propos­
als) . 
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strategies that market participants can pursue. First, they can seek to 
change the law. Legal change can be pursued in a number of different 
ways. For one, market participants can pursue legislative action. They 
could lobby the Delaware legislature to pass a law changing the take­
over standards set by courtS.79 Similarly, they could lobby Congress or, 
in some cases, the Securities and Exchange Commission to preempt 
Delaware law with federal laws or regulations. Alternatively, market 
participants could try to modify the law through the common-law 
process, by having Delaware courts overturn, limit, or modify their 
prior decisions. We will refer to this first set of strategies as the pursuit 
of legal change. 
Second, market participants could induce individual companies to 
reincorporate or change their governance structure through charter or 
bylaw amendments. These amendments can either directly "opt out"so 
of objectionable provisions of Delaware law or they can otherwise in­
directly change the effect of such law. For companies that are already 
public, reincorporations and charter amendments require the approval 
of both shareholders and directors,�1 while bylaw amendments typi­
cally require the consent of either the board or shareholders. For 
companies that go public, the board typically determines the content 
of the IPO charter and bylaws taking into account the effect, if any, of 
these provisions on the IPO share price. We will refer to this strategy 
as the pursuit of opt-outs. 
Third, market participants could seek to modify the corporate 
governance and managerial incentive structure by other means. The 
various elements of the governance and incentive structure interact 
with each other, often in complex ways. A change in the legal standard 
or an exogenous shock (such as an increase in the risk of hostile take­
overs) can upset the balance between a legal standard and the other 
elements of the incentive structure. One way to reestablish the bal-
79 In every state where the courts prohibited the use of poison pills, the state legislature 
overturned the decision. See Eric S. Robinson. John C. Coates IV, and Mitchell S. Presser, State 
Takeover Statures: A Fifty State Survey ( 1989) (privately published, on file with authors). 
so The term ''opt out" is slightly inaccurate, as sometimes the action is better thought of as 
opting in to some particular governance arrangement (for example, a staggered board). 
Sl In most instances, companies would have to amend their charter or reincorporate into a 
different state to opt out of a legal rule. See, for example. Gilson, 34 Stan L Rev at 780-92 (cited 
in note 7) (examining antitakeover provisions adopted as charter amendments). Charter 
amendments and reincorporations must be approved by both the board and shareholders. See R 
Del Code Ann § 242(b) ( 1 991 & Supp 1999) (charter amendments) and § 25 l (b)-(c) ( 1 991 & 
Supp 1997) (mergers). In some instances. a company can opt out of a legal rule through a bylaw 
provision. which typically requires approval by either the board or shareholders. Companies 
could also try to opt out de facto by spinning off substantial assets through subsidiaries that are 
incorporated in a different jurisdiction or contain different charter provisions. But  see Hilton 
Hotels Corp v ITT Corp, 878 F Supp 1 342. 1 35 1  (D Nev 1 997) (enjoining spin-off of substantial 
assets in midst of takeover battle). 
I 
( 
( 
l 
( 
f 
( 
, 
( 
( 
2002] Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law 889 
ance is to modify the other elements to create a new equilibrium. 
Adaptive devices that rebalance the governance and incentive struc­
ture can take multiple forms, including changes in the compensation 
regime, changes in board composition, changes in the shareholder 
composition, or changes in the capital structure. Depending on the de­
vice, adoption may require formal approval by the board and/or 
shareholders, approval by outside directors, actions by corporate offi­
cers, or actions by a subgroup of shareholders. We will refer to this 
strategy as the pursuit of adaptive devices. 
In drawing a distinction between legal change, opting out and 
adaptive devices, we are trying to draw attention to different modes of 
response. Legal change requires action by the legislature, a regulatory 
agency, or the courts. Opting out requires private action, but in a for­
mal state-created regulatory framework. By contrast, adaptive devices 
can take a variety of forms, many of which are more graduated and 
less formal than legal change and opt-outs. 
All three of these strategies have been pursued from time to time. 
For example, judicial rulings holding poison pills invalid were quickly 
overturned by state legislatures."2 Similarly, the SEC's enactment of 
Rule 13e-4�.l to prohibit discriminatory self-tender offers overturned 
the Delaware Supreme Court ruling in Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum 
Co'M that permitted such an offer."� And the negative reactions of 
prominent M&A lawyers to rulings by the Chancery Court that ques­
tioned the validity of the "just say no" defense were clearly aimed to 
get Delaware to revise those decisions."" 
A clear example of opting out is the widespread adoption of 
charter amendments that limit directors' monetary liability for nonin­
tentional breaches of the duty of care. These amendments were 
prompted by the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v Van 
Gorkom,:<1 which was seen to enhance the risk of such liability, and the 
subsequent passage of section 102(b )(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law,"'' which permitted opt-out amendments. Another re­
cent instance of systematic opting out in response to a change in the 
N2 See note 79. 
ll3 Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price. SEC Securities Act 
Release No 6653, [ 1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) � 84,016 (July 1 1 ,  1 986); 
Tender Offers by Issuers, SEC Securities Act Release No 6596, [ 1 984-85 Transfer Binder) Fed 
Sec L Rptr (CCH) <j{ 83,798 (July 1 ,  1 985) (proposing an amendment to the rules). 
!14 493 A?d 94/'i (Del "1 985). 
85 See id at 958-59 (finding that Unocal's offer was reasonable in relation to the threat). 
X6 See Gordon. 9 1  Colum L Rev at 1959, 1959 n 95 (cited in note 20) (quoting from two 
Wachtel!. Lipton. Rosen & Katz memoranda urging that "Delaware act[ ] quickly to correct'' the 
ruling and warning that unless "it is . . .  reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court.'' companies 
may migrate out of Delaware). 
X7 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985). 
&< 8 Del Code Ann * 102.(b)(7) ( 1991 & Supp 1993). 
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law involved Pennsylvania's strict antitakeover statute enacted in 
1990. In  the immediate aftermath of the enactment, most exchange­
traded Pennsylvania companies opted out of one or more prongs of 
the statute.x" Since the enactment, companies reincorporating into 
Pennsylvania regularly opt out of its antitakeover laws.91' Other exam­
ples of opting out include the variety of antitakeover charter amend­
ments enacted in the early years of the tender offer boom and the 
massive reincorporation of companies from New Jersey in the 1910s. 
The takeover setting also provides examples of the adoption of 
adaptive devices that change the practical significance and effect of a 
corporate law provision by modifying other parts of the incentive 
structure. Indeed, as discussed below, such devices-specifically, 
changes in board composition and in the executive compensation re­
gime-changed the significance of the takeover standards set by the 
Delaware courts. Other examples of adaptive devices in the takeover 
setting include the establishment of employee stock ownership plans 
("ESOPs") in the 1980s, which placed voting power in the hands of 
the company's employees, who were expected to oppose takeovers out 
of concern over job cuts,"' and substantial increases in debt, which may 
have enhanced efficiency by reducing the agency cost of free cash 
flows.n 
B .  The Tradeoff Among Strategic Responses 
How does one choose among strategies for responding to change 
or, for that matter, decide whether to respond at all? While a detailed 
examination of this question goes beyond the scope of this Article, we 
begin, at least, to sketch the boundaries of the domain of choice. 
Broadly speaking, from the perspective of a group of dissatisfied mar­
ket participants, strategies differ along two dimensions: their effec­
tiveness in rectifying a problem and the ease with which they can be 
implemented. For legislative reversal, dissatisfied market participants 
S9 See Roberta Romano. Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover 
Stallltes. 6 1  Fordham L Rev 843. 859 ( 1 993) ( finding that forty-three of sixty·three exchange 
traded firms opted out of all or portions of Pennsylvania's takeover statute, that fifteen did not, 
and that no information was available as to the remaining five firms). 
90 See Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition, working paper 
(2002) (on file with authors) (finding that all three companies that reincorporated into Pennsyl­
vani::t between 1998 and 200  opted out of Jl! of the provisions of its :mtital:eovcr bw). Sec also 
Daines and Klausner, 17 J L, Econ. & Org at 97 (cited in note 45) (find i ng th:ll all Pennsylvania 
firms in a study of 3 1 0  IPOs opted out of Pennsylvania ·s disgorgement stntute). 
91 See generally Eric Grannis. Note, A Problem of Mixed Motives: Applying Unocal ro De· 
fensive ESOPs. 92 Col urn L Rev 35! (1992) (analyzing the ESOP dcfenst:). 
<J� See Michael C. J..:nsen. ;\};t:tlcy Cusls of fi·t!e Cash F/ows, 76 Am Econ R..:v Papers and 
Proceedings 323, 324-25 ( l 9R6) ( a;guing that increases in debt C<ln red•JCe managerial agency 
costs). 
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must possess the political power to get a new law enacted. Tnis may be 
the case when there is a broad consensus among market participants 
that the present law is just plain wrong. Most amendments to the cor­
porate code in Delaware are the product of such a consensus.�3 Legis­
lative reversal may also occur when one interest group or a coalition 
of groups captures the political process. Many commentators interpret 
the antitakeover statutes passed by several states, albeit not necessar­
ily the one passed by Delaware, as resulting from the capture of the 
legislative process by a few large local employers, possibly in coalition 
with employee representatives.94 
Legal change through judicial action differs from legislative re­
versal in several respects. First, judges do not directly respond to po­
litical pressure the way legislatures do and often act for nonpolitical 
reasons. Second, legal change through judicial action is often a by­
product of an individual controversy between two parties, rather than 
the result of a broad strategy to accomplish legal change. Third, judge­
made law is typically more open-ended, more flexible, and less deter­
minate than statutory law. Depending on the issues involved, legal 
change through judicial actions may therefore be more or less easily 
implemented, and be more or less effective, than legal change through 
legislative action. Delaware fiduciary duty case law, which contains 
numerous instances in which a court has refined or retracted portions 
of earlier opinions,95 can be interpreted as a reflection of one or more 
of these differences. 
93 See Curtis Alva. Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 
15 Del J Corp L 885, 903-16 ( 1 990) (discussing the political process that produces amendments 
to Delaware's corporate law). 
94 See Kahan and Kamar, The Myth of State Competitio11 (cited in note 90): Romano, 61 
Fordham L Rev at 854-56 (cited in note 89) (noting rhat ir. most states " [t]akeover laws are typi­
cally sponsored by a local chamber of commerce at the behest of a major domestic corporation," 
while. because of the large number of firms incorporated in Delaware, "no one firm's manage­
ment has the clout to get a bill enacted"'): Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti- Takeo ver 
Statwes and the Market for Corporate Charters . 198� Wis L Rev 365, 373 (arguing that the pas­
sage of many ant itakeover laws reflects the influence of particular corporations in the state legis­
lature). But see Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen. Firms ·  Decisions Where to Incorporate at 27. 
Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No 35 1 (Feb 2002), available online at 
<http:i/www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> (visit�d Apr 9, 2002) (suggesting that stan­
dard antitakeover statutes are intended to attract incorporations): Guhan Subramanian. The In­
fluence of Antirakeover Srarutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on !he " Race" Debate and An­
rirakeover Overreaching at 40-43. Harvard O M  Research Paper No 10-10 (Dec 200 1 ) ,  available 
onlint' :-�t <'hltp://r"�rer�.�srn.com/abstract-292679> (q<;ited .6.pr 9. 2002). 
'15 Examples of cases that refine the legal st;::ndard include: Unocal, 493 A2d 946. 954-55 
(Del 1 'J�5) (establishing intermediate standard of re\·iew): Alomn l' i/ousehold lnremarional, fnc, 
490 A2d 1059, 1076 (Del Ch i 985) (subjec1ing poison pills to Unocai review); Rev/on. 506 A2d at 
184 (establishing stricter standard for sale or breakup of a cumpany): and Braz.en v Bell Arlamic 
Corp. h95 A2d 43. 47-49 (Del 1997) (reviewing termination f..:.: unJer r ules of liquiJatc:u Jam­
ages. r<tther than the business judgment rule). QVC. Weinberger. and Rabkin are all examples of 
retracti0ns. Parctl/1011!11 Conununicalions. h:c 11 QVC .Venvnrk. Inc. 637 A2d 34, 37-45 (Del 1993) 
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Opt-outs, in turn, have two potential advantages over legal 
change. First, opt-outs may be easier to implement than legislative 
change. Opt-outs require either the governance power to obtain board 
and/or shareholder approval for an opt-out by an existing public com­
pany or the "pricing power" to induce managers to opt out when they 
take a company public. Thus, as a result of either shareholder pressure 
or directorial judgment, many existing Pennsylvania companies opted 
out of the state's anti takeover regime,% which was enacted to protect a 
politically powerful local employer.97 Second, opt-outs may be more 
effective if firms are heterogeneous and the desired rule varies from 
company to company. 
Adaptive devices also may be pursued either because they are 
easier to implement or because they are more effective. Adaptive de­
vices may be easier to implement because the requisite action neces­
sary for adoption does not require formal legislative, board, or share­
holder approval. Adoption may be easier for other reasons as well. 
The device may be less visible and therefore generate less opposition 
(compare, for example, informal pressure to redeem a poison pill with 
a formal bylaw amendment requiring redemption).'ili Similarly, its ef­
fect may be more ambiguous or less well understood (an ESOP, for 
example, could serve as an anti takeover device or as a bona fide bene­
fits plan). Further, it may have a greater claim to legitimacy (it is hard 
to oppose more independent directors). Final ly, an adaptive device 
may be easier to implement because it utilizes carrots rather than 
sticks (contrast, for example, incentives from executive compensation 
and incentives from the threat of legal liability) .'"' Setting aside ease of 
implementation, an adaptive device can enable parties to achieve their 
goals more effectively than legislative change or opting out because it 
offers more flexibility and fine-tuning (compare, for example, a more 
independent board with a prohibition of poison pills). More generally, 
(retracting portions of Time-Warner on whether change of control triggers Rev/on); Rabkin v 
Philip A. Hum Chemical Corp. 49H A2d .1099, 1 104--06 (Del 1985) (retreating from the exclusivity 
of appraisal approach in Weinberger, 457 A2d 701); Weinberger v UOP, Inc, 457 A2d 701, 715 
(Del 1983) (retreating from the business purpose test of Singer v Magnavox Co. 380 A2d 969 
(Del 1977). 
% See Roberta Romar.o. The Genius of Americall Corporate Lm�· 68-70 (AEI 1993) (find­
ing that out of 199 Pennsylvania firms with identifiable choices. ''127 opted out of all or part of 
the (anti takeover! statute, while 72 firms did not"). 
97 See Leslie Wayne. iV/any Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State�- Takeover Protection, 
NY Times A1 (July 20. 1990) (noting that "[t]he law was introduced into the Pennsylvania legis­
lature at the urging of Armstrong World Industries to fend off an unwanted takeover bid"). 
911 For example. directors may prefer to implement voluntarily a suggestion made by share­
holders. rather than have the shareholders make a formal proposal submitted to shareholders at 
large, in order Lo avoid the humiliation of an adverse shareholder vote. 
99 For examr!e. both greater u�e of stock option<. and greater restrictions on tnkeover de­
fenses make it more likely that an unsolicited bid will be consummated. but manngers are likely 
to favor the form·�r over th� iattcr. 
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because adaptive devices come in many forms, with different approval 
requirements and different economic effects, they greatly increase the 
flexibility of market participants. 
To some degree, legal change, opting out, and adaptive devices 
represent different ways of achieving similar goals. The attractiveness 
of each strategy therefore relates, both statically and over time, to the 
attractiveness of the alternative strategies. Thus, for example, to the 
extent that adaptive devices are easily available and effective, the 
pressure on legislative or judicial alternatives will be reduced. More­
over, if an innovation improving the attractiveness of one strategy 
emerges, the prevailing balance between the strategies can change. 
The innovation of the poison pill, for example, reduced the pressure 
for legal change or the adoption of antitakeover charter provisions.1110 
By the same token, dissatisfaction with the existing governance and 
incentive structures and difficulty in modifying them can increase in­
centives to develop innovations in each of the strategies. For example, 
the attempt to introduce mandatory bylaw amendments to redeem 
poison pills can be understood as an innovative opt-out strategy ne­
cessitated by the failure of boards to respond to informal shareholder 
pressure and precatory resolutions. 
C. Responses to Takeover Law 
How, then, do the last twenty years of mergers and acquisitions 
relate to this framework? To start with, in the 1980s, there was an ex­
ogenous shock to the corporate law system. What, exactly, triggered 
the takeover boom of the 1980s is unclear and multifactored,1111 but, in 
the space of a few years, the world changed. Hostile takeovers became 
commonplace and provided new challenges to the existing legal struc­
ture. 11'2 This exogenous shock triggered a variety of changes, including 
changes in Delaware's takeover jurisprudence. 
In retrospect, how did the corporate world respond -and not re­
spond-to the 1980s Delaware takeover decisions? First, Delaware 
did not change its statutory law signi ficantly,'"·' for example, by passing 
tOO In contrast. in states where courts held poison pi lls invalid, the pressure for legislative 
change increased. and led. in all such cases. to the enactment of legislation permitting poison 
pills. See note 79. 
tot See Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and lvlerger Activity 
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s. 15 J Econ Perspectives 1 2 1 .  123-32 
(Spring 200 1 )  (examining the struclUral triggers of the takeover boom). 
t02 See Gilson. 26 Del J Corp L at 493-97 (cited in note 1 )  (discussing Delaware ·s response 
to the changing corporate climate). 
103 See William T Allen, Jack B. Jacobs. and Leo E. Strine. Jr.. The Great Takeover Debare: A 
Meditation on Bridging the ConcqHunl Divide. 69 U Chi L Rev 1067. l OfiR (2002) ( " [A]mend­
ments to the DGCL have rarely been the method used to confront the major developments oc­
curring in  the mergers and acquisitions marketplace."). 
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a law prohibiting poison pills and other frustrating actions absent 
shareholder approval (the kind of approach taken by the U.K. in the 
City Code)."" Delaware's principal legislative effort105 -the adoption of 
its moderate anti takeover law, codified as Section 203 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law in 1 988-was largely moot by the time it  
was enacted.1(JI\ Unlike post- Van Gorkom, there was no sufficiently 
broad political consensus that Delaware takeover law was wrong or, if  
wrong, about how it should be changed. The contentious battle over 
the takeover sections of the American Legal Institute's Principles of 
Corporate Governance provides some anecdotal evidence of the ab­
sence of consensuS,107 as does the long-running debate in the law re­
views described earlier. 
One did, of course, find the Delaware Supreme Court and Chan­
cery Court playing active roles in the development of Delaware take­
over law. But the tensions and disagreements between the Chancery 
Court's approach and the Supreme Court's approach," .. and the doc­
trinal tensions within each approach, provide further evidence of the 
difficulty of forging standards that are clear, consistent, and acceptable 
to most market participants. 
Second, and strikingly-at least for corporate law academics 
critical of Delaware's approach -market participants did not induce 
many companies to opt out of Delaware law through charter provi­
sions.1"" Such charter provisions could have, in line with the views held 
1 04 On the U.K. approach, see Paul L. Davies, Gower�� Principles of Modem Company Law 
783 (6th ed 1997): 
(Ajiler :1 bona fide offer has been committed to the board of the target . . .  no action may be 
taken by the board without the approval of the company in general meeting which could 
result in the offer being frustrated or to shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide 
on its merits. 
105 There have been some other, relatively narrow, legislative changes in Delaware, such as 
the recent amendment to Section 25 1 of the Delaware Code th:l.l permits directors to submit a 
merger to a shareholder vote that they were ready to recommend when the merger agreement 
was signed but are no longer ready to recommend at the time of the vote. See R. Franklin Baloti 
and Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delmvare Law of Corporations & Business Organizations­
Sta/11/ory Deskbook § 251 at 219 (Aspen 1 999) (amt:!nding S..:ction 251 of the Delaware General 
Coporation Law) . There have also been some legislative and r<::gulatory changes in federal law. 
See, for example. note �3. 
106 See John C. Coates IV 'fllkevver Defenses in the Slwd()lv of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Sciemific Evidence, 79 Texas L Rev 271 ,  320-23 (2000) (showing how the pill dominates most 
other takeover defenses and arguing that .  with judicial appruval and widespread adoption of the 
pill in the late 1 9R0s. these other defenses became vestigial). 
107 See A.A. Sommer. .I r.. RevielV oj Charles Hansen, A Guide to the 1\m..:rican Law !IIStitll/e 
Corporate Corcnwnce Project. 5 1  Bus Luw 1 33 1 .  1 332-33 (1 996) (describing some of the "many 
firestorms gen..:rated by the ALl initiative"). 
lOS See. for example. Time-Warner. 571 A2d at 1 1 53 (crit icizing lnt�>rco and not adopting 
Chancery Court's re:1sonir.g in the cnse <tt har). 
109 Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel. two leading academic opponents o f  thc Delaware 
t akeover j u risprudence. took it for gJ<•ntcd that companies would opt O l i l  of it wh·.:-n 1 hey went 
2002] Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law 895 
by many academic commentators, either restricted poison pills directly 
or made them ineffective by ensuring that shareholders could replace 
directors outside of the annual meeting. With already-public compa­
nies, one might argue that such opting out did not happen because 
Delaware law requires board approval (in addition to shareholder ap­
proval) to amend the charter.' lll Managers opposed to such amend­
ments may thus have been able to prevent their passage. In other in­
stances, however-most notably in response to Pennsylvania's anti­
takeover law- the board's power to block charter amendments did 
not prevent massive opt-outs of takeover-inhibiting laws."' Similarly, 
shareholders are enjoying significant success in their efforts to get 
boards to repeal dead-hand features of poison pills.112 The fact that in 
some circumstances boards have agreed to remove takeover-inhibiting 
provisions, but that boards have not agreed to redeem regular pills, 
suggests that the requirement of board approval does not, by itself, 
explain when takeover defenses are repealed. 
Moreover, the requirement of board approval does not explain 
why takeover-enhancing provisions were not included in the charters 
of companies that go public, when pre-IPO owners have incentives to 
adopt governance provisions that maximize the price at which they 
can sell shares to the public. One does not, for example, find IPO char­
ters that limit the use of poison pills or incorporate the City Code's 
"no frustrating actions" standard."J To the contrary, to the extent that 
IPO charters and bylaws contain special provisions, they inhibit hos­
tile takeovers.'!" To be sure, the failure to adopt takeover-enhancing 
provisions in IPO charters does not conclusively establish that such 
provisions would not increase firm value. l\1aybe imperfections in IPO 
pricing dull the incentives to adopt value-maximizing governance pro­
visions.", Maybe entrepreneurs do not rationally pursue their long-run 
self-interest in setting governance terms during IPOs, or maybe the 
public. See Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Stmcrure af Corporate Law at 205 (cited in note 
17) (asserting ( inaccurately) that ·'firms go public in easy-to-acquire form: no poison pill securi­
ties, no supermajority rules or staggered boards. Defensive provisions are nddcd later."'). 
1 10 See 8 Del Gen Code Ann § 242(b) (199t & Supp 1 999). 
I 1 1  See text accompanying note•; 89-90. 
I 12 See TIAA-CREF Urges Nasdaq, NYSE 10 Require Shareholder Approval of Option 
Plans, PR Newswire (cited in nok 74) (noting that fiity-one of sixty corporations approached by 
TiAA-CREF agreed to remove dc;ad-hand features from their pills) . 
1 13 See Davies. Gower's Modern Cornpanv Law at 78.1 (cited in note 104) ( citine_ General 
Principle 7). 
1 1 4  See Daines and Klausner. 17 J L. Econ. & Org < it  R5 (cited in note 45) ( .:::<amining the 
charters and bylaws of 310 firms g.oi ng public and finding that two-thirds had prcn isions to im­
pede hostile acquisitions and that no firms had terms to avoid �ubsequent adoption of antitakc­
over provi�ions). 
I IS See id at 1 1 3  (noting the possibility that anti takeover provisions in !PO cktrters arc not 
iully priced). 
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governance provisions that maximize the value of start-ups differ from 
those that maximize the value of mature companies. Nevertheless, the 
general failure to opt out to make Delaware law more takeover­
enhancing-whether by charter amendments or in an IPO -warrants 
the conclusion that market participants regard the board's ability to 
"just say no," unlike, for example, Pennsylvania's law or dual-class 
stock,11" as not seriously detracting from company value, and possibly 
as enhancing it. 
Rather than by changing the law or opting out of it ,  market par­
ticipants principally adjusted to Delaware takeover law through adap­
tive devices.117 As discussed earlier, one finds significant changes in the 
structure of compensation contracts during this period, with new 
means of incentive alignment being developed, and older mechanisms 
being used more widely and i ntensively.''R Specifically, we find much 
higher magnitudes of stock options granted to executives, with fea­
tures such as accelerated vesting upon a change of control.' ' � Such 
compensation devices provide substantial incentives to managers to 
accept an unsolicited takeover bid.'2" Consistent with our interpreta­
tion of stock options as adaptive devices to management's power to 
resist a bid, managers in companies with antitakeover provisions re-
116 See id at 95-97 (finding that all Pennsylvania firms in their sample opted out of Pennsyl­
vania's disgorgemcnt statute and that only 6.4% of all firms in the sample had dual-class stock). 
1 17 For purposes of our argument. it does not matter whether market participants pushed 
for a more independent board and incentive compensation because of the effect of these meas­
ures on incentives to accept a takeover bid. While such a causal connection is plausible. i t  is suffi­
cient for our argument that market participants noted that these measures. adopted for whatever 
reason, had the effect on such incentives and took this effect into accoun t  in  deciding how to re­
spond to Delaware's takeover regime. 
lt8 See text accompanying notes 61-66. 
1 19 To be sure, another reason for the increase in stock options was a change in the tax laws 
that limited the deductibility of compensation in excess of $ 1  million unless such compensation 
was performance related. This change provided an incentive for companies to substitute stock 
options and perfom1ance based bonuses for fixed salary. Of these two devices, however, stock 
options provide greater incentives to agree to an acquisition than bonuses. In fact, during the 
1990s, stock options increased by much more than bonuses. While stock options may also have 
other advantages over bonuses (such as a lesser impact on current earnings or lesser manipula­
bility), the facts are consistent with our conjecture that stock options acted as an adaptive device 
to takeovers. 
120 See Kamar. !Yianageria/ Change-in-Con1ro/ Benefirs and Takeovers at 12-17 (cited in 
note 66) (analyzing benefits managers can derive in a change of control). Others have noted the 
interrelation between the poison pill's entrenchment effects and the structure of executive com­
pensation. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon. Poison Piils and cite European Case. 54 U Miami L Rev 
839. 840-41 (2000) (describing the shirt in entr..:nchment effects of the pill as stock options be­
come more prevalent in executive compensation ) .  
r 
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ceive more valuable options,'2' and managers of companies with large 
blockholders receive fewer optionS.122 
In  addition, independent directors play an increasing role in  the 
governance of public corporations.'2_, The presence of independent di­
rectors makes it more likely that a board will be receptive to an unso­
licited offer. For one, the independent directors may not go along with 
a decision to reject the offer. Second, because of the independent di­
rectors, a CEO's tenure may already be less secure.124 This has several 
effects. I t  means that the CEO has less to gain by fighting to stay on. I t  
also means that, given the standard compensation contracts, there is 
all the more reason to depart with the rich send-off of a sale, rather 
than the less generous provisions of a normal termination. Finally, de­
parting in the context of a sale of control is likely to be better for a 
CEO's reputation than being fired by the board. 
There is substantial evidence that these devices have neutralized 
to a substantial extent managerial opposition to unsolicited bids. Most 
importantly, the high level of M&A activity indicates that there are no 
high barriers to deals. Also, poison pills are mostly used by target 
boards to buy time (and bargaining power) in order to negotiate a 
higher price with the raider or to find a white knight, rather than to 
"just say no." 
1:!5 
Our framework suggests that there are two plausible explana­
tions for the failure to pursue seriously a strategy seeking opt-outs or 
legislative change in response to the takeover standard developed by 
Delaware. First, the ultimate complex takeover regime-combining 
power of the board to block a bid (and to threaten to block a bid to 
extract a higher price), financial incentives for target managers to ac­
cept one, and oversight by outside directors with increased substantive 
independence -may indeed reflect an equilibrium that is superior to 
the one that could be achieved by opt-outs or by legal change estab­
lishing a "let shareholders decide" regime. Shareholders, in other 
words, may have learned to love the pill. According to this explana­
tion, shareholder pressure to remove pills would be isolated and con­
centrated in the relatively few companies that failed to adopt effective 
12 1  See Kenneth A. Borokhuvich, Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino, CEO Contrauing 
and Antitakeover Amendrnellls, 52 J Fin 1495, 1 503-12 (1 997) (finding higher levels of CEO com­
pensation at companies which had adopted antitakeover amcnd:11ents). 
122 Harley E. Ryan. Jr. and Roy A. Wiggins T I T .  The Influence nf Firm- and Mnnoger-S;wcific 
Characteristics on the Stmcture of Exewtive Compensation, 7 J Corp Fin ! I l l ,  l 04 (20( ) ! )  (finding 
a ·'negative relation between stock options and blockho!der ownership"). 
123 See text accompanying notes 46-59. 
124 See text accompanying notes 58-59. 
125 See Lipton. 69 0 Chi L Rev at l fl:'i3 (cited in note 1 )  (noting that. since Timl'- Wnrnr:r, 
not a single Delaware court decision has addressed an instance in which directors used a pill to 
··just say no"). 
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adaptive devices. Such pressure would be intended as much to induce 
boards to adopt such devices as actually to remove pills. Supporting 
this explanation, anti-pill proposals are relatively rare, have declined 
over time, and are associated with a decline in the stock price.120 Even 
institutions that have taken a leading role in corporate governance 
matters and categorically oppose other antitakeover devices. such as 
dual-class shares, dead-hand pills, or reincorporations into states with 
significant antitakeover legislation, take a case-by-case approach to 
regular pillS.127 We will refer to this explanation as the "effectiveness 
hypothesis." 
Alternatively, shareholders may have lacked both the political 
power to change the law and the governance power to achieve opt­
outs. The reduction in the efforts to induce opt-outs reflects a realiza­
tion of the futility of that strategy, not an embrace of the pill. What 
shareholders could do, however, they did do: They largely prevented 
the passage of new takeover-inhibiting charter amendments and, when 
a proposal to redeem a pill was on the ballot, they voted for i t  by in­
creasing margins.m Beyond that, shareholders had to compromise with 
managers, offering them huge piles of money to buy off their opposi­
tion to unsolicited bids and subjecting them merely to the less threat­
ening discipline of independent directors rather than to the less 
forgiving takeover market. At least given the availability of these de­
vices, pursuit of this compromise was seen as a superior strategy to a 
more antagonistic (and less likely to be successful) pursuit of opt-outs. 
Shareholders, then, do not love the pili, but they have learned to live 
with the pill. As to IPOs, other explanations- such as the notorious 
abnormalities in IPO pricing or the strong attachment entrepreneurs 
may feel to companies they take public- account for the absence of 
takeover-enhancing, and the presence of takeover-inhibiting, charter 
terms .. We will refer to this explanation as the "implementability hy­
pothesis.'' 
116 See text accompanying notes 73-74: John M. Bizjak and Christopher J. Marquette. A re 
Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions ro Rescind 
Poison Pills. 33 J Fin & Quant Analysis 499, 5 1 9  (1 998) (finding empirical evidence that ant i-piU 
resolutions arc associated with a decline in the share price); Georgeson Shareholder. Inc. Corpo­
rare Governance: fnsriturional Voting on Poison Pill Rescission 3. availabk online: at 
<http://www.g�orgesonshareho!der.com/pdf/CGpoisonpill.pclf> (visited Mar 30. 2002) 
("[SJh�reholder propos:�! proponents tend to target compilnies with pnor perform;mce."). Thi' 
explanation is also consistent with the fact that the declining number of anti-pil l  proposals that 
ilre made garner increased support by shareholders. Sec text accompar.ying note 74. 
127 See TfAA-CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, avai l�hk online at 
<http://v.ww.tiaa-cref.org/libra/governancc/inclex.html> (visi ted Mar 30, 2002) ("Jn evaluating 
proposals with anti-takeover implications. TIAA-CREF wilt consider the broad COJ>icxt of take­
over defenses <lt  a panicular company.''). 
!:'� Sc:c tc:.xt accompanying notes 7J-7.J,. 
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What is most striking about the recent history of takeovers is 
that, regardless of which hypothesis is correct, the use of adaptive de­
vices seems to work reasonably well for the participants. The level of 
M&A activity, the percentage of friendly versus hostile deals, the de­
cline in efforts to adopt "show stopping" charter amendments such as 
dual-class recapitalizations, and the failure of states offering extreme 
antitakeover measures such as dead-hand pills to attract incorpora­
tions all suggest that the intensity of managerial insecurity has been 
tempered, and with it managers' opposition to selling the company. 
For buyers, the current state seems satisfactory: Payments owed man­
agers under incentive compensation contracts can be budgeted into 
the price; the amounts, while large for CEOs, are of the same order of 
magnitude as investment banking fees and amount to a relatively 
small percentage of the deal price; and market participants generally 
assert that deals that make economic sense get done. 
For target shareholders, the current state likewise seems satisfac­
tory: Managers have largely adopted "shareholder value maximiza­
tion" as their mantra; target shareholders earn significant premia in 
friendly deals; and the market through the 1990s soared. Finally, the 
current state suits most potential target managers: They stand to get 
rich on their options and their "golden parachute" packages should 
they be made redundant by an acquisition. 
Overall, political controversy over takeovers has died down and 
the more hyperbolic claims by the partisans- that permitting a board 
to block a bid amounts to "corporate treason "12" or that preventing the 
board from blocking a bid constitutes "a dagger aimed at the hearts""" 
of corporations-have vanished from the public debate. In other 
words, the system as a whole is in an equilibrium with no substantial 
pressure for radical change. The only people who think that there re­
mains a systematic problem to be solved are commentators who view 
the threat of managers being penalized by a hostile tender offer as an 
essential tool for disciplining management or who resent the high lev­
els of compensation engendered by stock options.131 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Our interpretation of the events of the last twenty years has a 
number of implications, which we explore in this Part. They relate to 
the predictability of the effects of exogenous shocks once market par-
129 Gilson, 35 Stan L Rev at 52 (cited in note 16). 
130 Gordon. 91 Colum L Rev at 1959 n 95 (cited in  ilote 20) (quoting Wachtel!. Lipton. 
Rosen & Kaiz memoranJum). 
131 See. for example. Bebchuk and F<'!rrell, 87 Va L Rev al 1 1 3  (cited in note 78) (advocating 
federal intervention to generate a '·let shareholders decick" regime). 
900 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:871 
ticipants had the chance to respond to these shocks, to the distinction 
between unilateral and bilateral responses and the privileged position 
of bilateral responses in Delaware law, to our assessment of how and 
why D elaware sanctioned the poison pill, and to the danger of stale­
ness in corporate governance structures in general, and the argument 
that staggered boards reflect such staleness in particular. 
A.  The Possibility of  Responses Makes I t  Harder to  Predict the 
Effects of a Legal Development 
Our analysis of how the takeover battles of the 1980s evolved 
into the wave of friendly deals in the 1 990s has several lessons. The 
most basic is that the effect of exogenous shocks and doctrinal 
developments-such as the rise in hostile takeovers and the 
developments in Delaware takeover law- cannot be analyzed ceteris 
paribus, assuming that nothing else changes. Rather, such 
developments must be analyzed mutatis mutandis, taking into account 
the changes made in response. 
In the area of corporate law, such an analysis is often difficult. 
First, there is a multiplicity of ways of responding- pursuing legal 
change, pursuing opt-outs, pursuing various types of adaptive de­
vices- each with its own power dynamics. Second, the collective ac­
tion and information problems affecting shareholders mean that 
shareholder-initiated responses may be uneven among issues, among 
companies, and over time. Third, differences- both among firms and 
over time-in the composition of boards, the shareholder profile, and 
so on, will cause different firms to respond to legal developments in 
ways that are different and that are not always conducive to the 
maximization of firm value. 
Responses to doctrinal developments have indeed ameliorated, 
neutralized, or even reversed their initial effect. Consider, for instance, 
Van Gorkom, which at the time was viewed cs greatly increasing the 
potential liability of directors for breaches of their duty of care. In re­
sponse to Van Gorkom, Delaware passed a statute permitting compa­
nies to adopt charter provisions opting out of such liability,132 and most 
companies availed themselves of that option. Tlms, Van Gorkom may 
have been a major case ceteris paribus, but turned out largely insig­
nificant mutatis mutandis. Similarly, "just say no" was a much more 
problematic defense in the corporate governance world of the 1980s 
than it is today, with differently constituted boards and different in­
centive compensation regimes. Finaliy, consider what happened in 
those states in which courts invalidated poison pills- decisions pre-
132 Sec S Del Code An01 § l 02(b)(7) ( 1991 & Supp 1993). 
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surnably applauded by protakeover commentators. In each of these 
states, legislation permitting pills was enacted.'33 In one instance, that 
legislation turned out not merely to sanction regular pills, but to vali­
date the dead-hand pill, which Delaware courts have struck down as 
per se invalid. 134 
B .  Unilateral versus Bilateral Responses 
We have argued above that the responsive behavior of the 1980s 
and 1990s largely moved in the right direction and resulted, overall, in 
increased firm value. I n  a sense, this is evidence of the welfare effects 
of flexibility. The 1980s takeover decisions generated a situation in 
which large potential gains could be obtained by improving incentives: 
If managers could be led to act in shareholders' interests, firm value 
would increase substantially. The silver lining of the agency cost cloud 
in big U.S. firms is that the amounts that you need to pay managers to 
do the right thing are generally small compared to the benefits that 
doing the right thing creates for shareholders. We view the spread of 
adaptive devices as a mix of carrots (generous stock options) and mild 
sticks (more independent boards) that created such incentives. From 
this vantage point, the last twenty years represent a fascinating case 
study of how corporate governance structures adapted to a new 
environment. 
This, however, does not mean that each and every move along the 
way was itself welfare-enhancing. In particular, we want to distinguish 
between responses that were partially bilateral-that is, that enjoyed 
some measure of support, formal or informal, by both shareholder 
groups and management- and those that were unilateral -that is, that 
were pursued by one of these groups against strong opposition by the 
other. The distinction between bilateral and unilateral devices is im­
portant in two respects. First, the more bilateral a device is, the more 
likely it is to be welfare-enhancing and stable. Second, attention to the 
degree of bilateral-ness helps shed light on Delaware's regulation of 
takeovers. 
1. The distinction between unilateral and bilateral responses. 
To illustrate the distinction between unilateral and bilateral stra­
tegic responses, consider the increased number and independence of 
m See Robinson. Coates, and Presser. St{/[e Takeover Swrures (cited in  note 79). 
134 See lnvacare Cnrp v Healthdyne Technologies, Inc, 968 F Supp 1578 (N D Ga 1997) (in­
terpreting Ga Code Ann § 14-2-624, which was passed to override a court decision that invali­
dated regular poison pills. to sanction de:�d-band pills). But see Bank of Nc1v York Co, Inc v Ir­
ving Bank Corp, 528 NYS2d 482, 485 (1988) (invalidating a dead-band pill not included in the 
target's c�rtificat\! of incorporation) .  
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outside directors, on the one hand, and dead-hand poison pills, on the 
other. The changes in board composition over the last twenty years 
are due to formal and informal shareholder pressure and to boards 
acting of their own accord. In the former case, shareholders did not 
encounter strong managerial opposition. Boards became increasingly 
independent with the acquiescence of incumbent board members; 
confrontational election contests designed to increase the number of 
independent directors are practically unheard of. In the latter case, 
shareholders were cheering while their board was acting. By now, out­
side board members have largely taken control over the nominating 
process and majority-outside boards have thus become, to some ex­
tent, self-perpetuating.135 By contrast, dead-hand poison pills were 
validated, legislatively or judicially, over shareholder opposition and 
are adopted by boards over shareholder opposition. In our terminol­
ogy, the increasing independence of boards is a bilateral governance 
device; the dead-hand pill is a unilateral device. 
2. Welfare effects and stability of strategic responses. 
We hypothesize that bilateral devices are more l ikely to be wel­
fare-enhancing than unilateral devices. More specifically. bi lateral de­
vices arc usually welfare-enhancing; uniiateral devices, by contrast, 
may or may not be welfare-enhancing. Our rationale for this hypothe·· 
sis is twofold. First, it relates to the direct effect of the device. Second, 
it relates to the stability of the device. 
Relative to unilateral devices, bilateral devices bring shareholders 
and managers to the bargaining table. As the product of a consensual 
and retlective participatory process, the direct effect of the device is 
likely to be a Pareto improvement. At the same t ime, hO\vcver, bilat­
eral devices are likeiy to reflect compromises when the interest of 
managers and shareholders conflict. Because of these two features, bi­
lateral devices will tend to reflect an acceptable solution for share­
holders and managers. but not necessarily the optimal solution for ei­
ther; they will  tend to constrain self-interested managerial actions that 
are highly detrimental to shareholders, but aisu entail payolfs to man·· 
agers that may be greater than c!eserved. 1:." Their ovcrali direcLion, 
however, generally will be to enhance welfare. 
Moreover, because a bilateral device is based 011 compror.nise and 
consensus. i t  is not likely to engender a s tra [egic response t h a t  eradi-
135 Korn/Ferry l n t.::rnationai. 1.7Ih Annual Boartl o( Oirccton Study al J 3 (citeJ in  note -l�q 
(noting that.  by 2000. 7-+% oi boards had nominating cvmmittec5 ili1d that  these commillet-s 
were, on average. ccmposcd of thrcc outside board members and no inside b<Xlrd members). 
'1" Sec BoroKhovich, Brunarski, and P:.mino.52 J Fin :11 1 :'0:>-12 (rit�d i� note 1 2 1 )  (fit1ding 
thai managers ,,f comp:1 11ies with antitakeover prov:�ions receive hoth high,:r salaries ;mel more 
valuable sto�k option$ tlu,-, manag<:rs of compani-:�; "·i:hral! siKh provi�ions). 
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cates or reverses its direct effect. As a result, if the direct ceteris pari­
bus effect of a bilateral device is to enhance welfare, i t  is likely that 
the overall mutatis mutandis effect will also be welfare-enhancing. By 
contrast, unilateral devices are more likely to generate a strong strate­
gic response, thus making their mutatis mutandis effect harder to pre­
dict. 
Critics may respond that the dichotomy between unilateral and 
bilateral devices is a false one. Rather, the real distinction lies between 
devices that shareholders can approve on their own accord - which 
are presumptively wealth enhancing- and devices that boards can ap­
prove on their own accord- which are suspect (with devices that re­
quire both shareholder and board falling in between). 
Maybe so. We agree that, as owners, it is shareholders who have 
the ultimate sovereignty over corporate decisionmaking. Indeed, cor­
porate law accords shareholders such sovereignty, with the caveat that 
shareholders must usually exercise it indirectly via board members 
elected by the shareholders. ·we think that excluding boards from cor­
porate decisionmaking engenders several problems.1)7 Shareholder­
elected boards have information anJ expertise beyond ihat available 
to shareholders at large. Boards also have the capacity to protect 
shareholders against actions designed to exploit shareholders' collec­
tive-action problems-such as coercive offers!),' or even noncoercive 
"take it 0r leave if' offers --- and board members can more easily be 
held accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties. Fina1ly, as long 
as boards retain (as they must in public corporations) the power to 
manage the company, a unilateral, board-opposed governance meas­
ure is likely to induce a strategic response by the board. 
C. Bilateral Devices and Delav.;are Corporation Law 
\Vhether bilateral devices are more likely to be welfare­
enhancing t han unilateral devices, they hold a privileged position in 
Delaware corporate law. This bias in favor of comp romise in Delaware 
takeover law is a product of strong pressures to compromise deep in 
the strucLUre of Delaware corporate l a w  more gene1 a l ly. ·with a struc­
ture favoring compromise. it is not s ;_t rpris! ng that ,  when the challenge 
of hostik takeovers emerged in th•:: 1 980s, the Delaware response 
sought to channel condw:t in famil iar directions. 
1.'7 S<!e i3..:11chuk. 6SI U Chi L Rev at 10'21\ (..:iteu in note 1 )  (agreeing that boards should be 
pc:rllliilcd 10 dday shareholder votes for some peri•)u due to �uch problems). 
i .'·' s,�e Fkhchuk. <JR l larv L Rev at ! 7 1 7-3? (citl!u in note 7) (describing the distorted 
choi<.:<" <hat �h;m�holders face in wkeover bid�). 
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1 .  The importance of bilateral devices. 
Consider the important decisions that require bilateral approval. 
The Section 251 merger, which is in some ways the paradigm Dela­
ware mechanism for the transfer of control, requires a board resolu­
tion and approval by shareholderS.139 A sale of all or substantially all 
the assets requires approval of both the board and the shareholderS.140 
Any amendment to the charter requires board recommendation and 
shareholder approval.141 Finally, dissolution requires a board recom­
mendation and shareholder approval, unless shareholders unani­
mously approve it.142 
The substantial deference that Delaware gives to decisions that 
are approved by informed shareholders reinforces this tendency. For 
example, in conflict transactions, shareholder approval removes the 
"void or voidable" taint and can both shift the burden of proof and 
change the ultimate standard of revieW.143 
Delaware's approach to outside directors has a similar effect. 
Outside directors stand, in many ways, between managers and 
shareholders and are thus potential agents of compromise. On the one 
hand, they are usually less informed than managers, but better in­
formed than shareholders, and, in crisis situations, can obtain addi­
tional information and act more easily than shareholders can. On the 
other hand, they have less potential bias than managers do (since they 
earn comparatively little for their board service) ,  but also often do not 
have substantial equity stakes in the company. Moreover, Delaware in 
contrast to other jurisdictions,IJJ employs both formal and substantive 
scrutiny before it gives weight to actions by outside directors. For an 
outside director to be deemed "independent," the absence of an ex­
ecutive position or of a financial interest in the transaction is not suffi­
cient. Rather, to be regarded as an independent director, an outside 
director must act independently and take her role as such seriously.1·s 
139 See 8 Del Code Ann § 25 1 ( b)-(c) ( 1991 & Supp 1997). 
140 Id § 271 ( 1 99 1  & Supp 1997). 
141 See id § 242(b) ( 1991  & Supp 1999). 
1 -12 See id § 275 (1991). 
143 See Lewis v Vogelstein. 699 A2d 327, 338 (Del Ch 1997) (finding that recent cases ac­
corded "substantial effect to shareholder ratification''). 
144 See, for example, Michigan Business Corporation Act. Mich Comp Laws Ann 
§ 450. 1 107(3) (West 1990) (defining "independent director" largely by reference to formal crite­
ria). 
1-15 See. for example, Rabkin v Philip A. f-Junr Chemical Corp, 498 A2d 1099, 1 106 (Del 
1985) (criticizing an independent committee for not negotiating and holding that approval by 
committee did not change standard of analysis); Kahn v Tremonr Corp, 694 A2d .:122, 429-30 ( Del 
1997) (criticizing members of an independent committee for not devoting sufficient care to their 
tasks and holding that approval by the committee did not change the standard of analysis); i\4il/s 
Acquisition Co v i\1acmil/an, Inc. 559 A2d J 261 ,  1265 (Del 1988) ( finding that in the "absence of 
any serious oversight by the al legedly independent directors.'' a board's action has to meet the 
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Approval by substantively independent directors in itself adds a 
measure of bilateralism to the device. Indeed, we find that Delaware 
encourages the approval of substantively independent directors in a 
host of contexts. Approval by independent directors is critical, for ex­
ample, in the setting of executive compensation. Similarly, and more 
generally, approval by independent directors shifts the burden of 
proof in transactions between an interested controlling shareholder 
and the firm, and can shift both the burden of proof and the applica­
ble standard of review in transactions between an interested director 
and the firm. 
Further, corporate law affords a much greater scope for changing 
the governance structure of a corporation through charter amend­
ments, which require the approval of both the board and of share­
holders, than through bylaw amendments, which can be passed unilat­
erally by either the board or the shareholders. Under Delaware law, 
there is great flexibility in what can be included in the charter: 
[One may include] [a]ny provision for the management of the 
business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and 
any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow­
ers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any 
class of the stockholders . . .  if such provisions are not contrary to 
the laws of this State.1.u. 
Turning now specifically to takeover law, one finds the same def­
erence to the product of bilateral decisionmaking. For example, Dela­
ware courts invalidated a dead-hand poison pill adopted unilaterally 
by the board, holding that such a pill would be valid only if incorpo­
rated in a charter provision approved by shareholders.1n In the same 
vein, the court held that charter amendments approved by sharehold­
ers do not need to pass enhanced scrutiny under UnocaC..,., We simi­
larly predict that Delaware courts will hold that shareholders cannot 
unilaterally adopt bylaw provisions restricting poison pills. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom,��· we would regard such a holding as enhancing 
shareholder rights. Both the board and shareholders have the unilat­
eral power to adopt bylaw amendments, and the de facto ability to 
standard of "intrinsic fairness"). 
146 8 Del Code Ann § 102{b )(1)  ( 1 991 ). 
147 Quicklltm Design Systems, Inc v Shapiro, 72 1 A2d 1281, 1291-92 (Dd 1998) {holding 
that Ddaware law requires any limitation on a board's authority be set out in the certificate of 
incorporation). 
14H Williams v Geier, 671 A2d 1368, 1 377 (Del i YLJ6) (determining that a " Unocal analysis 
should be used only when a board unilaterally . . .  adopts defensive measures"). 
1 49 See, tor example, Gilson. 26 Del J Corp L at 507 (cited in note l) ("Fifteen years of ex­
perience with Unocal teaches that shareholders ought to decide whether to acct:pt a n  offer made 
to them."). 
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pass such amendments is much higher for the board than for share­
holders. '51' Thus, it is in the long-run interest of shareholders to limit the 
domain that can be regulated by bylaws when the interests of share­
holders and managers conflict. 
The greater deference to decisions by disinterested directors also 
carries over to the takeover context. When independent directors 
form a majority, "proof that the board acted in good faith and upon 
reasonable investigation is materially enhanced."151 The enhanced scru­
tiny of board actions under Revlon and its progeny can also be under­
stood as limitations on unilateral governance decisions. Enhanced 
Revlon scrutiny applies to takeover defenses in transactions when the 
company or control over the company is being sold. Such defenses are 
inherently more unilateral than "just saying no" since, after the trans­
action is consummated, shareholders lack the power to oust the board. 
In other words, Rev/on prevents a board from using the cover of a pill 
to take unilateral actions that render the shareholders' ability to re­
move the board and repeal the pill meaningless. This renders the deci­
sion closer to the bilateral decision of a classic merger under Section 
251 .  
Finally, when a board adopts unilateral measures that overstep 
the proper bounds, Delaware courts do not just limit the measures to 
their proper size. Rather, they invalidate them as a whole. Thus, for 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the lock-up op­
tions and termination fees granted by the target boards in Revlon and 
Paramount Communications, Inc v QVC Network, Inc'5� rather than 
reducing their amount or removing the features that the court deemed 
objectionable.'53 This aU-or-nothing approach reduces the relative at­
traction of unilateral measures by increasing the downside risk. 
2. Bilateral devices and Delaware's position in the market 
for incorporations. 
Interestingly, an approach that induces consensus and compro­
mise is consistent with Delaware's interests as the leading producer in 
the market for incorporations. For several decades, Delaware has 
150 A board can act quickly and faces no collective action problem. In addition. in some 
companies there is a supermajority requirement for shareholder bylaw amendments. 
151 Ivanhoe Partners v iYewmom A·lining Corp, 535 A2d 1 334, 1343 (Del 1987), citing, inter 
alia, Puil.. " Guud. 507 A2tl 531, 537 (Dd 1986 ): Red on. 506 A2d at 176 n 3;  and Moran v H0u.<e­
hold fnlemuliunal, inc, 500 A2d 1346, 1356 (Del 1985). 
152 637 A2d 34 (Del 1993). 
t53 See id at 37 (invalidating the lock-up option and suggesting to the Chancery Court that 
the termination fee:: should also be invalidated). See generally David A. Skeel. Jr., A Reliance 
Uamages Approach co Corporale Lockups. 90 Nw U L R..:v 564 (1996) (proposing a different ::�p­
proach or distinguishing which lock-up provisions should be enforced based on the bidder's reli­
ance inll:r..:st). 
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faced no major competitor in its efforts to attract incorporations by 
public companies.15• Franchise taxes from these companies are an im­
portant source of revenue for Delaware, accounting for more than 
24% of its total tax revenueS. 155 Thus, the major risk for Delaware is 
not a gradual erosion of its competitive advantages, but a seismic shift 
that would leave important constituents-shareholders, managers, or 
financial intermediaries-highly dissatisfied. Such a shift could frac­
ture the market for incorporations- with some companies opting for a 
state with pro-shareholder laws and others for a state with pro­
management laws- or generate the political support necessary for the 
adoption of a federal corporate law. In either case, Delaware would 
stand to lose significant revenues. This is the enduring lesson of New 
Jersey's failure in the 1910s and Delaware's subsequent rise to promi­
nence as the domicile of choice.156 
The advent of hostile takeovers could have produced such a 
seismic shift. Takeovers brought to the fore issues where the amounts 
of money at stake were large and the conflicts between shareholders 
and managers significant. The challenge for Delaware was to come up 
with a set of rules that, in conjunction with adaptive devices, would 
leave both shareholders and managers sufficiently satisfied to avoid 
significant governance pressure on existing public companies to rein­
corporate elsewhere, to avoid significant market pressure to induce 
companies to incorporate elsewhere at the IPO stage, and to avoid 
significant political pressure to pass a federal corporate law. Put this 
way, Delaware's challenge was to "satisfice" rather than optimize.157 
Delaware's cautious approach- the contextual, two-steps­
forward-one-step-back tendency of its case law, the fact that its take­
over statute came late and was mild, and its encouragement of bilat­
eral responses-can all be understood as responses to this challenge. 
Recall, from our earlier discussion, that to the extent that parties can 
154 See Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate 
Law. 86 Cornell L Rev 1205. 1210-14 (200 1 )  (pointing to Delaware's profitability as evidence of 
its market power). 
155 See Government's Recommended Operating and Capital Budget Information: Financial 
Overview, a vailabie online at <http:/fwww.state.de.us/budget/fy2003/op_fin_ov.pdf> (visited Mar 
31, 2002) (projecting $593 miilion franchise tax revenues in $2.3 billion budget for fiscill year 
2003). 
156 See William L. Cary, Federalism a11d Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware. 83 Yale 
L 1 663, 66]- 65 ( 197"l) (pointing out th.11 change� in New J�.;r�cfs corporate law led to Dela­
ware's rise). 
157 This tcrm was coined by economist Herb·�rt Simon to describe a decisionmaker who is 
willing to '"settle for good-enough answers in despair of finding the best answers ... See, for exam· 
pie, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Dt'L·i�ivmnaking, 25 Pub Admin Rev 3 1 .  33 ( l985). See also 
Herbal A. Simon anJ Jo�eph 8. Kadene. Optimal Problem-Solving Search: A fl-or-None Soltt­
tions, in Herbert A. Simon, 1 fi.JoJels of Bounded Uationalitv: Econvmic 1\na!ysis and Ptth!ic Pol· 
icy 248 (MIT 1 982). 
908 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:871 
reach equilibrium through adaptive devices, the pressure to pursue le­
gal change or to opt out will be reduced. ��· In the takeover context, this 
meant that the ability to achieve a satisfactory equilibrium within the 
Delaware system removed pressure either to change the law through 
federal intervention or to opt into a different state's takeover law 
through reincorporation, either of which could have undermined 
Del a ware's preeminence. 
From today's perspective, Delaware passed this test with flying 
colors. Federal law did not significantly encroach on the takeover area; 
as shown in Table 4, the proportion of public companies incorporated 
i n  Delaware is rising; Delaware's franchise tax receipts have reached 
unprecedented levels;15� and states that adopted a radically pro­
management takeover regime did not attract substantial incorpora-
• IN! 
tions. 
15X See Part I I .B. 
15'! See Kahan and Kamar, 86 Cornell L Rev at 121 1 (cited in note 154) (documenting the 
increase in franchise tax reven ues). 
I no See text accompanying note 90. Set: also Subramanian, The lnjlueiJ(:e of Amiwkcm·er 
Statwes on Incorporation Choice at. 54-61 (cited in note 94) ( tinding that these laws reduced 
incorporation); Daines and Klausner. l7  J L, Econ, & Org at 96--97 (cited in nott: 45). 
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TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES INCORPORATED IN 
DELAWARE BY IPO Y EAR 
IPO Year % incorporated in 
Delaware 
1 980 39% 
1981 45% 
1 982 31% 
1 983 40% 
1 984 39% 
1985 48% 
1 986 60% 
1 987 72% 
1 988 59% 
1 989 61 % 
1 990 62% 
1 991  64% 
1992 69% 
1 993 6 1 %  
1 994 60% 
1995 67% 
1 996 70% 
1 997 62% 
1 998 66% 
1 999 76% 
2000 81 % 
Source: Robert Daines. The /vlarket for CorporaLe Law: 
Lawyers. Takeovers. and the Home Court Advantage at 
Appendix A, working paper (on file with authors). 
D. The Poison Pill Reassessed 
909 
So what do we make of the poison pill at the end of the day? At 
least in the first instance, poison pi l ls  are adopted unilaterally by the 
board of director . Indeed, the fact that the pill did not require share­
holder approval was one of i ts main attractions. As a doctrinal matter, 
Delaware courts could easily have held that a poison pill requires 
shareholder approval, for example, by analogizing the pill to a stock 
transfer restriction rather than, as it did,  to an antidilution provision in 
convertible ecurities. '"' Yet they did not. How then does the pill fi t 
16 1  See 1\tloran v Household lnternarional. Inc, 500 A2d 1 346. 1352 (Del 1985) (endorsing 
analogy of a poison pill to an antidilution provision). A pill n.:sembles a transfer restriction in 
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into our discussion of the welfare effects and the stability of unilateral 
devices and to our assessment of Delaware's preference for bilateral­
ism? 
For one, though adopted unilaterally by directors, a regular poi­
son pill- the only kind valid in Delaware-has several bilateral fea­
tures. First, as the court stressed in Moran v Household International, 
Jnc
162 and reaffirmed in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc v Shapiro,1�3 
shareholders must retain the ultimate authority to remove a pill by 
replacing the board. Second, i t  is independent directors, rather than 
the board as a whole, who call the shots on whether to redeem the pill 
when faced with a hostile bid. And third, because the pill has not been 
approved by shareholders, any specific decision by the board on 
whether to redeem the pill is scrutinized by the court under Unocal. 
And this scrutiny, while lax when the pill is used to "just say no," re­
mains meaningful when the pill is used to cram-down on shareholders 
a defensive maneuver designed to inhibit a takeover bid.IM Thus, the 
ultimate effect of the pill is akin to "just say wait": it leaves the deci­
sion on whether to accept a bid to the outside board members, but 
only until shareholders can replace the board, and in the meantime 
discourages defensive board actions. 
Despite these bilateral features, Moran can be viewed as a deci­
sion that was discontinuous with the deep structures of Delaware 
law - an experiment, if you will. B ut note how this experiment was 
conducted. The pill was endowed with bilateral features that amelio­
rated its unilateral effect. These features were even more pronounced 
in early pills, which permitted shareholders to redeem a pill. And 
though Moran permitted the use of certain Hip-over pills, it was not 
until much later -when the court could see how market participants 
reacted to and employed pills- that it became clear that boards could 
adopt much stronger flip-in pills, without shareholder redemption fea­
tures, to "just say no." By proceeding incrementally. the courts could 
monitor the course of the experiment, with the ability to limit the ef­
fect of the pill if it proved necessary. The Interco doctrine, for example, 
was one approach the Delaware Supreme Court could have taken if 
the pill had proved too potent.1�5 1bis cautious approach also allowed 
that its et'fect is to encumber the transf�::r of shares to a shareholder when that transfer would 
trigger the pill. [\ is no coincidence that Delaware ·s antitakeover law. which has a similar effect 
as the pill, is included in 1 hc subdtdj)ler oil stock transfers. 
162 500A2d 1 3·16 (Del l985). 
163 721 A2d 12�1 (Dd 199�). 
LIH See Time- Planu:r, 571 A2d at 1 154-55. 
165 A second, less convincing, j ustification for the pil l  is t hat  it restun.:d the bilat·ernlism of a 
Section 251 merger. Th1s JUStit:cation ts problematic for �everal rt:<��uns that have been di:;cussed 
in the literature, includiilg: thnt Delaware does not prevent rnanag.:rs from evading the bilatt:ral­
ism of a Section 25 1 merger by using a triangular merger structure: that a tend..:r ufkr itsdf is 
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for the evolution of adaptive devices. It  may also have prevented 
worse results. Recall that i n  every state where courts blocked poison 
pills, the legislatures overruled the courts, leading in one state to the 
permissibility of dead-hand pills. 161i And even if the pill had been uni­
versally invalidated, management could have (as it did prior to the 
pill) resorted to other, more destructive defenses.1�7 
In the end, the pill was part of an array of responses to the ex­
ogenous shock generated by the increase in takeovers. Permitting 
boards to adopt pills unilaterally was a departure from Delaware's 
commitment to bilateral devices, but a measured one and one taken at 
a time when bilateral regulation of takeovers was not a realistic op­
tion. Ultimately, the pill contributed to a new equilibrium in which it 
seems to have been transformed into a device that plausibly is in 
shareholders' interests and certainly one with which shareholders can 
easily live. 
E. Staggered Boards and the Danger of Staleness 
Both for academics and shareholder rights advocates, the action 
has moved from the pill to staggered boards. vVhile the number of 
anti-pill proposals has steadily declined, shareholder resolutions call­
ing for the elimination of staggered boards are on the rise. Hardly any 
public corporation without a staggered board, aware of strong share­
holder opposition, dares to propose inclusion of such a term in the 
corporate charter.1"'"' Corporate governance theorists and empiricists 
regard a staggered board combined with a pil l to be a much more po­
tent takeover defense than a pill by itself and have adduced empirical 
evidence that staggered board provisions reduce shareholder wealth. 1"'� 
Indeed, the theoretical ability of shareholders to replace a board that 
refused to redeem a pill against shareholder wishes is substantially re­
duced in companies with staggered boards. 
Unlike pills, of course, a staggered board provision in the charter 
is a fundamentally bilateral device: shareholders either voted for the 
simply a sale of shares unregulated by the �tatute and, under Delaware's independent kgal sig­
nificance doctrine. should be presumed to be intentionally unregulated; and that tht.: argument is 
ultimately circular in that it presumes that the statutory structure intends that ali changes of con­
trol be bilat..:rally <.�pproved. See Gilson. 33 Stan L Rev at 8-15--17 (citeu in note 7). 
IM St.:e note 13-1. 
167 Delaware couns could have, of course. outlawed all ddenses. but this would hardlv have 
encouraged bilatcr;dism. 
168 See text accompanying notes 77-7'.!.. 
1(•9 Lucian Arye Bebchuk. John C. Coates I V, a:1d Guh<1n Subramanian, The Al1ii-'i"akeover 
Power of Classified Boards: Theory, Evide11ce ll/1(1 Policy. 55 Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2002 ): 
Robert Daines. Dues Delmvare Lmv Improve Fir111 Vulul'?. 62 J Fin Econ 525. 54fl (2001 ) : Robert 
M. Daines. Do Classified Boards Aflec/ Fir111 Value?: Tuke01'�.,. Defenses after the Poiso11 Pill at 
H 'i- I R. work ing  rarer (2ll0 1 )  (on file with authors). 
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provision or bought stock of a company with such a provision at an 
IP0.170 The controversy over staggered boards, however, points to an­
other potential shortcoming of a system based on bilateral devices. 
The price of a consensus-based system is that it privileges the status 
quo. This, of course, is not a problem if the status quo reflects a com­
promise that remains acceptable to shareholders and managers. B ut 
what if  the status quo loses its bilateral acceptability, either because 
market participants have changed their views or because the legal or 
economic context has changed? Then, a requirement of bilateral ap­
proval for change really amounts to giving the side that benefits from 
the status quo the unilateral power to veto a more appropriate resolu­
tion. This is a problem of "staleness" or legal obsolescence.171 
The problem of staleness is a real problem. In a common law sys­
tem with a statutory base, the system evolves and can find that fea­
tures interact in unanticipated ways. Thus, for example, in 1969, Sec­
tion 228 of the Delaware General Corporate Law was amended to 
permit shareholders to act by written consent outside of the annual 
meeting unless restricted by the certificate of incorporation.172 The 
amendment was meant as a pure convenience and as such was uncon­
troversial. Yet, with the arrival of hostile takeovers, written consent 
provisions took on a very different meaning and provided an unan­
ticipated route for removing incumbent directors. These provisions 
enable shareholders to replace a board between annual meetings in  
companies where directors can be  removed without cause. Thus, such 
provisions have the unanticipated effect of substantially reducing the 
board's ability to use a pill to block or delay a hostile bid. Though 
some boards may strongly dislike this effect, it takes shareholder ap­
proval to opt out. 
Staggered boards, as several commentators have suggested, may 
also represent a status quo that no longer commands bilateral ap­
proval,173 but this time with the shoe on the other foot. Many staggered 
170 The notable exceptions are Massachusetts and Maryland companies, where antitakeover 
laws imposed a staggered board (Massachusetts) or granted boards the unilateral power to adopt 
a staggered board (Maryland). See Daines. Do Classified Boards AffeCI Firm Value at 10-13 
(cited in note 169) (discussing Massachusetts law); Md Corp and Assoc Code § 3-803 ( 1999 & 
Supp 2001) (giving boards the power to establish staggered board without shareholder ap­
proval). 
171 See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Swtwes (Harvard 1982). 
172 See Del Code Law Ann § 228 (1969) (noting amendment by Ch 148, Laws of 1969). 
!73 See Sharon Hannes. Future Oriented Defaults: Reexamining the Limits of Contracrual 
Freedom in Corporare Law at 21-23, Harvard Law School Graduate Program Working Paper, 
available online at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Admissions/Graduatc_Programs/publications/ 
papers/hannes.pdf> (visited Apr 19, 2002) (suggesting that slaggered boards can lead to corpo­
rate stagnation): Behchuk. Coates, and Subramanian. 55 Stan L Rev (forthcoming) (cited in note 
169); Daines. no Classified Boards Affecl Finn Value at 3. 5-7 (cited in note 1 69); Bebchuk and 
Ferrell, 87 Ya L Rev at 126-28 (cited in note 78) (noting that since the start of the 1990s corpora-
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board provisions were adopted in charters prior to the advent of the 
poison pill. Prior to the pill, a staggered board did not prevent a hostile 
bidder from consummating a tender offer and acquiring a majority of 
shares. Faced with inevitable (though not immediate) ouster, the argu­
ment continues, incumbents would cave in and resign. Thus, prior to the 
pill, staggered boards did not block hostile takeovers. However, now 
that companies have pills, a staggered board is a strong antitakeover 
device. To overcome a pill, a hostile raider must replace the board in a 
proxy contest. In  a company with a staggered board, this takes over a 
year-longer than most raiders are willing to wait. If  shareholders had 
foreseen this, the argument concludes, they would not have approved a 
staggered board to start with. In this world, requiring both shareholder 
and board approval to remove staggered boards does not induce com­
promise, but arbitrarily entrenches management. 
Though this reasoning is plausible, it is not unassailable. For one, 
even prior to the advent of the pill, staggered boards served as a de­
vice to make it harder for shareholders to replace boards if they were 
dissatisfied and were often adopted as an antitakeover device.'7• After 
all, what other plausible purpose could such provisions have served? ' 7� 
Moreover, while staggered boards did not prevent the consummation 
of tender offers per se, they may well have deterred bids. A hostile 
bidder, faced with an intransigent board that cannot be replaced for 
up to two years, may decide not to spend billions to acquire stock of a 
company that it does not control. Even a bidder willing to proceed 
would have had difficulty in financing a bid with debt, as bids in the 
1980s were typicaily financed, if the raider couldn't assure the lender 
that he would control the target if the bid succeeds.17" Thus, a staggered 
tions have found it practically impossible to get shareholder approval to amend charters to in­
clude staggered boards and that shareholders have voted in large numbers to repeal existing 
staggered boards); Klausner, Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality at 2-3 (cited in note 73) 
(noting the increasing votes for proposals to declassify boards since 1987). 
174 Indeed, at the time when shareholders passed charter amendments providing for stag­
gered boards, they also passed other antitakeover amendments. Staggered boards were clearly 
recognized to be an antitakeover measure. See Disclosure in Proxy and Information Swtemencs; 
A n ti-t akeover or Similar Proposals, SEC Securities Act Release No 15230, ( 1978 Transfer BinderJ 
Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) <j[ 81 ,748 (Oct 13. 1978). Many academic commentators at that time at­
tributed such votes to invidious managerial pressun.: or plain shareholder inability to figure out 
what is good for them. 
175 The usual argument for staggered boards. to assure some general continuity in board 
membership, rings hollow i n  the context of director elections. where absent a takeover or proxy 
contest. incumbent directors are very likely to be renominated and reelected to their seats. See 
Allen, Jacobs, and Strine. 69 U Chi L Rev at 1 073 (cited !n note 103). Continuity is only an issue 
when shareholders make a concerted effort tv oust incumbent management (that is. during a 
control contest)-and in this context staggered board provisions obviously serve as a device to 
make it harder for shareholders to replace the hoard. 
m n1e usual structure of a debt fin�nced bid in the 191\0s required the bidder to make the 
assets of the target avail:lbk as security for the debt incurred to finance the bid. To do this. a hos-
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board may have been a more potent antitakeover device prior to the 
advent of the pill than today's academic critics of staggered boards let 
on. This, as well as the fact that 40% of the companies that went public 
post-pill have charters providing for staggered board, takes some wind 
out of the sails of those commentators who argue that the poison pill 
fundamentally changed the antitakeover effect of staggered boards 
and who would want courts to read such provisions out of existence.177 
Interestingly, there have been remarkably few cases where in­
cumbents held on after losing the first round of a proxy contest. 
Maybe directors give more heed to shareholder votes than the argu­
ment against staggered boards credits them. Moreover, no D e l aware 
court has ever elaborated what showing a staggered board must make 
to maintain a pill after shareholders have elected a slate favoring re­
demption of the pill. 17H This suggests that there is, with respect to the 
possible staleness of staggered boards, a solution that is consistent 
with Delaware's penchant for bilateralism. In applying enhanced scru­
tiny under Unocal to a decision by a divided board to "just say no," 
Delaware courts could explicitly take into account that shareholders 
have elected a slate that supports a takeover bid. Specifically, the fact 
that one-third of the board favors acceptance of the bid could be a 
factor in assessing the importance of the corporate objective threat­
ened; the fact that shareholders would have to wait for a full year until 
the next board election could be a factor in assessing whether a re­
fusal to redeem the pill - which prevents a sale of shares between con­
senting adults- is reasonable in relation to the threat. '7" We do not be­
lieve, however, that Unocal analysis requires the court to strike down 
a pill whenever directors with a classified board suffer an election de­
feat. ""' A more moderate approach, such as the one sketched above, 
would render the ability of shareholders to override a board deci­
sion - a  power that according to Moran is a reason why unilateral pills 
are valid to start with - more meaningful ;  it would encourage a more 
deliberative process by independent directors if they want to retain 
the pill;  it would respect the difference in governance arrangements 
tile bidder would have to control the board of the target and freeze-out any nontend�ring share­
holders. 
l77 See Bebchuk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1 034-35 (cited in note 1 ); Hannes, Fwure Oriented De­
faults at 2 1 -26 (cited in noie 173); Bebchuk. Co:ttcs, and Subramanian. 54 Stan L Rev (forthcom­
ing) (cited in note 169). 
i?S See Allen, Jacobs, and Strine, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 103) (describing this 
question as "open"). But see Bebchuk, Coat�.:s, and Subramanian, 5.5 Stan L Rev (forthcoming) 
(cited in note 169) (arguing that, coupled with a staggered board, the 'trength of the pil l  discour­
ages raiders from initiating a volt:). 
179 See Time-Wamer. 571 A2d at 1 152 (holding that Unucal analysis requires inquiry into 
importance of corporatt: objection and reasonableness of defensive measure). 
ISO See Bebchuk. ll<J U Chi L Rev at 1 028 (cited in note 1) (propo:;ing such a rule); Bebchuk, 
Co�lles. and Subramanian . .54 Stan L Rev (forthcoming) (cikd in note i fi9) (same). 
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between companies that have a staggered board and those without;'x' 
and it would be unlikely to provoke a managerial counterstrike. 
CONCLUSION 
The takeover wave of the 1980s destabilized the governance 
structure of U.S. corporations and generated significant public contro­
versy over the legitimacy of defensive devices. Twenty years later, the 
corporate governance structure has reached a new equilibrium and 
the public controversy has largely died down. 
In this Article, we examined the events of the last twenty years 
from two perspectives. First, we considered how market participants re­
acted to the challenges presented by hostile takeovers in general and 
the judicial validation of the poison pill in particular. Here, we suggest 
that market participants largely responded by adopting informal adap­
tive devices rather than by pursuing legislative change or by formal opt­
outs. Specifically, corporate boards became more independent and the 
executive compensation regime changed to provide managers with sub­
stantial benefits in the event of a change of control. Through these de­
vices, the pil l-a potentially pernicious governance measure that has 
been foisted upon shareholders without their permission and often 
against their will-was transformed into a device that is plausibly in 
shareholders' interests. Moreover, these devices- which were largely 
adopted with the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of both manag­
ers and shareholders-restabilized the governance structure and sub­
dued the controversy over takeover defenses. 
Second, we considered how Delaware law responded to, and 
shaped, these events. Here, we suggest that the distinction between bi­
lateral devices (which enjoy support from both shareholders and 
managers) and unilateral devices (which are adopted by one group in 
face of opposition by the other) is important for an understanding of 
Delaware takeover law. Delaware corporate law generally privileges 
bilateral devices, which are l ikely to be welfare-enhancing, enjoy 
greater stabili ty, and tend to further Delaware's status as the leading 
domicile for public corporations. The initial validation of the poison 
pill was a partial, and experimental, exception from Delaware's gen­
eral preference for bilateral devices. Over time. however, Delaware 
succeeded in fashioning a more consensual appruach to the regulation 
of takeovers. \Vhile this episode illu trates the potential benefits from 
bilateralism, the preference for bilateral devices Jl::>o tends to enshrine 
the status quo and may lead to undesirable stakness in the govern­
ance structure of corporations. 
lSI See Allen. Jacobs. and Strine. 69 U Chi L Rev at  1090 (cited in nNe 103) (noting that the 
staggered board rdkcts that sb areh��lders may n o t  change strategy on a single election). 
